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TNM Once Again Proves It Is The New Murasoli, Buttresses DMK’s Cash Splurge Ahead Of Tamil Nadu Elections

By
The Commune
-

The News Minute (TNM), the digital mouthpiece of Dravidian politics in Tamil Nadu, has outdone itself.

In a fawning article published on February 13, 2026, TNM went above and beyond to explain why Tamil Nadu Chief Minister MK Stalin’s decision to transfer Rs 5,000 each to 1.3 crore women in one go is a shining example of women empowerment.

The headline? A straight-faced: “Why TN CM Stalin decided to release Rs 5000 each to 1.3 crore women in one go.”

The explanation? Stalin had to “thwart” the evil BJP’s attempts to “halt the scheme” by hiding behind elections. The move, we’re told, was necessary to ensure women don’t face hardship in meeting expenses for medicines, children’s education, and household needs.

All very noble. All very heartwarming.

Except for one small problem.

The Bihar Template: When Nitish Did It

In October 2025, Bihar CM Nitish Kumar (NDA) transferred Rs 10,000 each to 25 lakh women (totaling 1 crore beneficiaries) under Mukhyamantri Mahila Rojgar Yojana for self-employment startups. Launched pre-elections with PM Modi’s involvement, it offered initial grants plus up to Rs 2 lakh follow-up, positioned as empowerment via Jeevika self-help groups.

The leftist ecosystem that TNM inhabits branded the move as “electoral bribes,” “vote-buying,” and “fiscally irresponsible giveaways.” The headlines didn’t ask “Why Bihar CM decided to release funds to women in one go” with sympathetic explanations. They asked pointed questions about timing, motives, and electoral manipulation.

The double standard is so glaring it’s almost comical.

Same action.

Same timing – both ahead of elections.

Same demographic – women voters.

Same mechanism – direct benefit transfers.

But diametrically opposite coverage.

Why?

Because TNM isn’t a news organization. It’s a propaganda outfit with a simple rule:

  • If a non-DMK, non-Dravidian government does it → it’s a bribe.
  • If the DMK does it → it’s empowerment.

This time, they use the examples of NDA-led governments in other states – Assam, Maharashtra, Bihar, MP, Haryana to justify DMK’s move to transfer the cash. This creates a normalization effect: If others do DBTs, Tamil Nadu’s move isn’t exceptional.

That indirectly supports Stalin’s justification.

The “Election Code” Dodging: Clever or Corrupt?

TNM’s article proudly explains how Stalin “thwarted” the BJP’s attempts to halt the scheme: “The advance disbursal of funds was therefore seen as a preemptive step to avoid any interruption.”

Translation: We rushed to give money before the election code of conduct kicks in, because once it does, we can’t.

Now imagine if a BJP-led government did this.

Imagine the headlines: “BJP govt in mad rush to distribute funds before code kicks in” — “Election Commission urged to investigate pre-code cash transfers” — “Opposition cries foul over timing of welfare payouts.”

TNM would be leading the charge.

But when the DMK does it? It’s “ensuring women don’t face hardship.”

The mental gymnastics required to maintain this position would win Olympic gold.

The Numbers Game: 1.3 Crore Women

Let’s do the math TNM doesn’t want you to do:

1.3 crore women = 13 million voters (or potential voter influencers in their households)

Rs 5,000 each = Rs 6,500 crore of public money

Disbursed in one go, weeks before elections

Justified as “advance payment” for three months

Now ask yourself: If this were a BJP government in any state, would TNM be writing sympathetic articles explaining why it was necessary to give 1.3 crore women Rs 5,000 each right before elections?

Would the headline be “Why BJP CM decided to release funds to women in one go” with a helpful video message from the CM?

Or would it be “BJP’s pre-election cash splash: Freebie or empowerment?”

We all know the answer.

The “Women Empowerment” Card

TNM’s article leans heavily on the “women empowerment” framing: “Beneficiaries would face hardship in meeting expenses for medicines, children’s education, and household needs if the Rs 1,000 monthly assistance was interrupted.”

This is genuinely touching.

But here’s the problem: This argument applies to every state.

Bihar’s women also have expenses for medicines, children’s education, and household needs. So do Assam’s women. So do Madhya Pradesh’s women. So do Maharashtra’s women.

But when those governments transfer money to women, TNM doesn’t call it “empowerment.” They call it “freebies” or, at best, report it with skepticism.

The “women empowerment” framing is selectively applied based on one criterion alone: which party is in power.

TNM did not bother asking one important question to the DMK. The same portal covered the various protests going on in the state, but they failed to ask why the money was not used to settle those problems rather than “empower women”.

The Assam Irony

TNM’s article mentions Assam’s Orunodoi scheme almost as a throwaway, noting that the Assam government is “looking at an early disbursement” to “circumvent the stay on DBT if the SC orders so in March.”

The tone? Disapproving. Skeptical. It’s presented as evidence of BJP “double-speak.”

But this is exactly what the DMK just did.

The Assam government is considering early disbursement to protect beneficiaries from potential interruption.

The DMK just did early disbursement to protect beneficiaries from potential interruption.

Same logic. Same mechanism. Same timing concerns.

But TNM reports one with skepticism and the other with sympathy.

The hypocrisy isn’t even subtle anymore.

The Credibility Question

Welfare transfers are legitimate policy tools.

They can empower.
They can relieve hardship.
They can stimulate local economies.

But they can also be electorally timed instruments.

Which interpretation prevails should depend on fiscal data, timing, and policy design, not party affiliation.

Consistency is the foundation of journalistic credibility.

When identical policy instruments receive opposite moral framing based solely on who implements them, the reporting platform transforms into a mouthpiece. And that is what TNM has become – The New Murasoli.

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Debunking The “Brahmins Had 100% Reservation For 3000 Years?” Myth Peddled By Leftists And Dravidianists

By
The Commune
-

“Brahmins had 100% reservation for 3000 years”, says Dr Vikas Divyakirti, echoing a common Dalit‑Bahujan criticism that for millennia, scriptural and social norms gave Brahmins a near‑total monopoly over education and “merit.”

It is an effective rhetorical device, but it is also, in this exact form, a distortion with intent, a shortcut that risks turning one community into the villain of every era, regardless of what the historical data in specific regions and centuries actually show.

In this article, we examine the colonial‑era educational surveys of William Adam in Bengal and Bihar, along with data from the Madras Presidency, to test the claim that “Brahminical Hindus” systematically denied education to so-called “lower castes”.

William Adam’s Surveys: Who Went To School In 1830s Bengal & Bihar?

In the 1820s, Scottish Baptist missionary William Adam arrived in Bengal to preach and “harvest heathen souls.” By the mid‑1830s, the British Governor‑General William Bentinck commissioned him to conduct an official survey of vernacular education in the “native schools” of Bengal and Bihar. Between 1835 and 1838, Adam submitted three official reports on education.

The schools he documented were indigenous institutions:

  • Run locally by Hindus in villages.
  • Funded by parents or village committees.
  • Taught in native languages like Bengali and Hindi.
  • Not operated or administered by the East India Company.
  • Distinct from the missionary schools, which were set up and run separately by Christian missions.

Adam’s data, taken at face value, seems to disprove the narrative that forward caste Hindus, especially Brahmins, monopolised education and excluded so-called lower castes. His caste‑wise breakdown from districts like Burdwan and South Behar shows that Shudra and socially disadvantaged castes not only had access to education in native schools, but in many places formed the majority of the student body.

Burdwan District: So-Called ‘Shudras’ Dominate Enrolment

In Burdwan district, Adam counted 12,408 Hindu students in native schools. The caste composition was roughly as follows:

  • Brahmins: about 3,429 students, or 27.6% of the student body.
  • Other Castes (Kayasthas, Vaidyas, Kshatriyas): 2,132 students, or 17.2% (Kayastha 1,846; Vaidya 125; Kshatriya 161).
  • Shudras: 6,087 students, which you correctly identify as about 49% of the total. Castes here included Sadgop, Aguri, Gandhabanik, Teli, Goala, Mayra, Kamar, Suvarnabanik, Tanti, Tamil, Kaivarta, Kalu, Tili, Napit, Vaishnava, Sunri, Sutar, Kumar, Swarnakar, Rajput, Mali, Kurmi, and others.
  • Avarnas: 760 students, or 6.1% of the total, drawn from Chandals, Doms, Muchis, Haris, Bagdhi, Dhobas, Jalias, Tiors, Garars, Mals, Pashis, and others.

In other words:

  • Brahmins + Other Castes: about 44.8%.
  • Shudras + Avarnas: about 55%, making them the majority of Hindu students in Burdwan’s native schools.

Dharampal’s and later analyses of Adam’s tables emphasise the same point: “the elementary school students present an even greater variety and it seems as if every caste group is represented in the student population, the Brahmins and Kayasthas nowhere forming more than 40% of the total.”

South Behar: So-Called ‘Shudras’ Form Over Four‑Fifths Of Hindu students

In South Behar, the picture is even more lopsided in favour of Shudra students. Adam’s tables show that Brahmins and other castes together were less than 17% of enrolled Hindu students:

  • Brahmins: about 250 students (≈ 8.6%).
  • Other Castes (Kayastha 220; Kshatriya 18): 238 students (≈ 8.1%).
  • Shudras: 2,364 students, about 81% of the student body. These included Gandhabaniks, Magadhas, Telis, Kairis, Rajputs, Kahars, Halwaikars, Sunris, Kurmis, Swarnakars, Mahuris, Napits, Goalas, Malis, Tamils, Lohars, Laharis, Kumhars, Kandus, Yugis, Beldars, Bundelas, Patowars, Vaishnavas, Khatkis, Barhais, Suvarnabaniks, Aguris, Kansyabaniks, Kalawars, and others.
  • Avarnas: 66 students, or 2.3%, explicitly classified by Adam as “very low castes” (Dosad, Pashi, Luniar, etc.).

Again, the headline is unmistakable:

  • Brahmin + Other Castes: ≈ 16.7%.
  • Shudras: ≈ 81%.
  • Avarnas: ≈ 2.3%.

This is the exact opposite of the claim of “100% Brahmin reservation” in schooling; Shudra groups overwhelmingly outnumbered other forward castes in Adam’s data for native schools in this district.

Adam’s Own Conclusion: “All The Castes, Both High And Low, Partake Of The Increase”

Adam did not just give tables; he offered qualitative commentary. In summarising his findings across districts, he emphasised that:

  • All castes, high and low, were present in the schools.
  • Even communities regarded as very low, such as Tior, Garar, Mal, appear in the enrolment lists.
  • In districts like Beerbhoom and Burdwan, vernacular schooling had undergone “a social change, partaking of the nature of a moral and intellectual discipline,” reducing prejudices and allowing children from different castes and even religions to study together.

He also notes that in the Beerbhoom and Burdwan districts there were 1,001 Muslim scholars in Bengali schools, and in South Behar and Tirhoot there were 177 Muslim scholars in Hindi schools, studying alongside Hindus. Teachers from Hindu and Muslim communities taught mixed classes, where students “of the different castes” and religions learnt together in the same schoolhouse.

This directly undercuts the idea that “Brahminical Hindu” village schools were structurally designed to block so-called lower castes from learning.

Missionary Vs. Native Schools: Where Did Avarna Children Actually Study?

Adam’s comparison of missionary schools with native Hindu schools produces another surprise.

  • Out of 760 students from the lowest castes, only 86 were in missionary schools, while 674 were in native schools.
  • Adam remarks that the “so considerable” number of low‑caste students in native schools proves that these institutions were already encouraging “the humbler classes” to seek education, without the need for missionary intervention.

That is, the Avarna participation rate was actually higher in indigenous village schools than in Christian missionary schools in the districts he studied.

This does not make missionary work irrelevant, but it challenges the myth that only Christian missions opened the school gates to other castes, while Hindu village schools operated as exclusive Brahmin enclaves.

Caste Of Teachers: Other Caste Instructors In “Brahminical” Institutions

Even more counter‑intuitive for the standard story is Adam’s data on the caste composition of teachers. In his tables for certain districts:

  • Brahmins and Kayasthas formed a significant share of teachers, especially in higher Sanskritic institutions.
  • Yet there were also schoolteachers from pther castes such as Sunri, Kalu, Dhoba, Bagdhi, and even Chandal – groups that later colonial and missionary narratives often portrayed as entirely excluded from literacy.

Adam notes that Hindu parents of “good caste” did not hesitate to send their children to schools taught by teachers of inferior castes or even of a different religion. That is a direct observation from the 1830s, not a retrospective apologetic.​

At the same time, when he looks specifically at Sanskritic learning – grammar, logic, law, literature, Vedanta, tantra, etc., he finds that nearly all teachers in those advanced institutions are Brahmins, and the scholars there are much more skewed towards other castes. So:​

  • Vernacular primary education looks socially inclusive and broad‑based.
  • Higher Sanskritic scholarship is much more Brahmin‑dominated.

This nuance is important: there was clear stratification at the level of advanced scriptural learning, but the “100% Brahmin reservation” claim does not apply even to basic village schooling in these districts.

Colonial Myth‑Making: Why the Data were Ignored

Despite Adam’s own numbers, colonial administrators and missionary authors often portrayed Hindu society as so rigidly caste‑bound that so-called ‘lower castes’ were systematically denied education. This narrative served several political purposes:

  • Justifying British “civilising” interventions in education and social reform.
  • Providing moral cover for missionary expansion and conversion efforts, especially among other castes.
  • Supporting the image of the colonial state as a benevolent corrective to “Brahminical oppression.”

Dharampal and other historians argue that Adam’s reports, if taken seriously, undermined a central pillar of this colonial justification namely, the claim that “Brahminical” native schools categorically excluded other castes. The British continued to lean on the stereotype rather than the data.

Madras Presidency: A Similar Pattern Down South

The pattern in southern India also disproves the “100% Brahmin reservation” narrative. Collector reports from the 1820s, later compiled and discussed by historians like Dharampal, show that in the Madras Presidency:

  • Out of around 30,211 male school students (in one set of returns), roughly
    • 20% were Brahmins and Kshatriyas,
    • 9% were Vaishyas,
    • 50% were Shudras,
    • 6% were Muslims, and
    • About 15% were “others”.​

A widely circulated summary of 1825 data for the Presidency states that of 11,691 schools and 1.42 lakh Hindu students, 78.5% were non‑Brahmins, while the remaining share were Brahmins and allied castes.

Image Source: Tamil Labs X account

As per this data, 78.5% of the 1.42 lakh Hindu students in 1825 Madras Presidency were non‑Brahmins and this indicates that Shudras and other non‑Brahmin castes formed the vast majority of Hindu students.

As in Bengal/Bihar, this does not mean caste hierarchies were absent or benign. It does show, however, that basic schooling was not reserved entirely for Brahmins even in early 19th‑century south India; socially disadvantaged caste enrolment was substantial, often dominant.

This data, thus shows, that in the 1820s–1830s, in specific regions of Bengal, Bihar, and the Madras Presidency, vernacular village schooling was socially broad‑based, with Shudras and socially disadvantaged castes often forming a majority of students.

It also shows that while some teachers came from socially disadvantaged castes, higher‑caste parents accepted such teachers for their children.

Why The “100% Brahmin Reservation For 3000 Years” Slogan Is Wrong

Within this historical nuance, the line “Brahmins had 100% reservation for 3000 years” collapses a deeply uneven history into a moral absolutism. It does three problematic things:

Temporal overreach: It treats three millennia of evolving social, political, and regional structures as if they were one monolithic Brahmin project, ignoring wide variations across time and space.

Empirical overstatement: In light of Adam’s 19th‑century surveys and Madras Presidency data, it is empirically false to say Brahmins had “100%” of educational seats, even in the last 200 years before modern reservation.

Collective demonisation: It frames an entire community as the permanent villain whose alleged total monopoly must now be “compensated” by policy, which encourages resentment and essentialising rather than accurate, targeted redress.

Colonial narratives about “Brahminical Hindus” running casteist schools were politically convenient for the British and missionaries, even when their own data (Adam’s reports) pointed to a much more mixed reality.

If we uncritically adopt those narratives today, an entire community is penalised and legal entitlements are designed on the basis of debunked or oversimplified stories.

If the goal is just reparative justice, we need morally serious, historically honest arguments, not slogans that flatten centuries of complex social reality into a single accusatory line.

(This article is based on an X Thread By Mumukshu Savitri)

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Cash Today, Tax Tomorrow: The Real Cost Of DMK’s ₹5,000 Transfer

By
The Commune
-
Borrow, Transfer, Repeat: The Fiscal Cost Of Stalin’s ₹5,000 Poll Gamble

The DMK government’s announcement of cash assistance to women beneficiaries under the Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thogai scheme has drawn criticism, with concerns being raised over the state’s fiscal position, debt levels, and governance priorities.

The government credited ₹5,000 to around 1.31 crore women, covering entitlements for February, March, and April along with an additional ₹2,000 ‘summer relief’ component. The disbursal, made ahead of elections, appears politically timed to generate voter goodwill.

At the same time, it has been acknowledged that financial assistance reaching economically vulnerable women can provide household relief. However, questions have been raised about the funding model behind the transfer.

Employment Problems Plaguing Tamil Nadu

Tamil Nadu faces a serious manpower gap in core services. In the police, against a requirement of roughly 1.24 lakh personnel, around 13,000 sanctioned posts remain unfilled. Thousands of youth who trained and prepared for police jobs are still waiting, with “no money” (for salary) cited informally as the underlying reason for not filling posts.

In the health department, doctors’ associations have claimed that about 60% of the 18,000 doctor posts in government hospitals are vacant. As a result, many primary health centres across Tamil Nadu function without adequate staff, forcing patients to run to district headquarters hospitals even for basic care.

This pattern is not isolated: across roughly 41 departments, funds are reportedly squeezed, recruitments are delayed or frozen, and the machinery of government is weakened while headline doles expand.

Debt Vs Revenue

Tamil Nadu’s 2025–26 Budget has a total outlay of about ₹4.39 lakh crore. Revenue receipts are projected at roughly ₹3.3 lakh crore, resulting in a substantial fiscal deficit of around ₹1.07 lakh crore that will be financed through borrowings. Against this backdrop of structural deficit, the government has also expanded welfare and pre-election measures — including the ₹5,000 special transfer under the Magalir Urimai scheme, and revisions in government employee pay — adding further pressure on the state’s finances.

This pushes the effective total funding requirement to about ₹1.05 – 1.07 lakh crore beyond normal revenue, leaving the state dependent on a combination of higher taxes, higher tariffs on utilities and fresh borrowing.

For states and countries, keeping the fiscal deficit within about 3% of GSDP is considered broadly healthy and necessary to retain credibility with banks and global lenders. When Stalin assumed office, Tamil Nadu’s deficit ratio was around 3%. Subsequent budgets have pushed this to about 3.5%, and the latest election‑driven commitments can push it further towards higher.

A higher deficit ratio directly affects the state’s ability to borrow on favourable terms and indirectly affects private industry, entrepreneurs and youth seeking loans, because financial institutions closely track a state’s fiscal health before committing funds.

Tamil Nadu’s debt stock when Stalin took over stood at around ₹5 lakh crore. In about four to five years, the government has borrowed an additional (roughly) ₹4.5 lakh crore, taking the total debt close to ₹9.4 lakh crore. With the latest round of borrowing-linked schemes, debt is now heading towards the ₹10 lakh crore mark.

The state is already paying roughly ₹70,000 crore every year as interest alone on outstanding loans. Additional election‑time spending funded through borrowing will push this interest bill up by another estimated ₹10,000 crore annually. This is not an abstract number: loans are taken in the name of the people, and the burden will be repaid through their taxes, tariffs and reduced services.

Debt Vs Spending 

This combination of high debt and populist spending directly constrains three critical areas: departmental funding, infrastructure, and industrial development and jobs.

Departmental funding shortfalls are already visible in unfilled police and health posts, undermining law and order and basic public health.

On infrastructure, between several hundreds of villages across Tamil Nadu face water scarcity every year. With adequate capital investment and planning, this water stress could be systematically reduced, but funds are not prioritised for such long-term works.

Urban and semi-urban areas face chronic issues: proper drainage networks are often confined to central parts of Chennai; second‑tier cities lag even further behind; and road infrastructure has seen little meaningful expansion in the last four years.

In industrial policy, Tamil Nadu has failed in recent years to bring in major new factories or large-scale industrial projects, even as other states aggressively acquire land, build dedicated infrastructure, and offer power and policy support. Electricity tariffs and other costs have been raised in ways that actively discourage industrial investment, including in sectors relying on renewable energy, pushing potential investors away instead of drawing them in. If the state had focused on industrial corridors, ready land banks and investor-friendly conditions, at least 5–10 lakh families could realistically have seen significant income improvement through quality employment.

All This Will Dawn Upon You As Higher Taxes And Poor Governance

The ₹5,000 transfer is timed immediately before elections and stacked as a lumpsum to maximise emotional impact on voters. The underlying political calculation is clear: once money arrives in accounts, many voters will feel gratitude, temporarily forget four years of weak fiscal management and jobless growth, and vote on the basis of immediate benefit rather than long-term consequences. Meanwhile, structural issues such as rising debt, high interest outgo, unfilled vacancies, underfunded departments, stalled infrastructure and an industrial slowdown are left unaddressed and, in fact, worsened.

Last Word

Supporting poor women is not the problem; cash assistance of ₹5,000 or even ₹10,000 can be sustainable if the state has a revenue surplus and simultaneously expands its own revenue through real economic growth, efficient tax collection and productive investment. The problem in Tamil Nadu today is a model where revenue is not meaningfully increasing, borrowing is soaring, core sectors are starved of funds, and yet high-visibility cash schemes are multiplied for electoral gain. This approach secures a short-term political dividend while mortgaging the future of the very families and youth whose votes are being courted.

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IIT Patna Professor Compares ‘Caste Segretation’ To Apartheid, Calls Hindu Society “Savarna Patriarchy” In “Research” Paper

By
The Commune
-

The IITs are increasingly coming under criticism for the ‘woke’ culture and thinking process they are trying to promote via education.

After IIT Bombay and IIT Gandhinagar, IIT Patna is under scrutiny. More specifically, Dr. Priyanka Tripathi, an English professor at Indian Institutes of Technology Patna, has come under criticism over a recent research paper co-authored by her, titled “Gendered and Casteist Body: Cast(e)ing and Castigating the Female Body in Select Bollywood Films.” The paper was written along with Bidisha Pal and Partha Bhattacharjee.

The study examines representations of caste and gender in Hindi cinema, with specific reference to films such as Bandit Queen (1994), directed by Shekhar Kapur, and Article 15, directed by Anubhav Sinha.

According to the paper, cinematic portrayals reflect layered structures of caste and gender oppression, particularly in relation to Dalit women. The authors argued that mainstream narratives often reproduce what they described as “Savarna patriarchy” and gendered hierarchies.

The paper also drew on academic and activist writings, including those of Suraj Yengde and Meena Kandasamy. Citing Kandasamy, the authors quoted the line: “For a man, the woman is the Dalit of the house,” to frame their argument that patriarchal structures cut across caste lines while intersecting with caste-based marginalization.

Image Source: OpIndia

In the study, the authors compared caste-based discrimination in India with racial segregation frameworks, stating that forms of social exclusion faced by Dalits could be viewed through lenses similar to apartheid-style segregation. They further contended that Dalit women face compounded marginalization due to both caste and gender identities.

Image Source: OpIndia

The paper also addressed sexual violence in cinematic narratives, arguing that depictions of rape in certain films reflect entrenched patriarchal and caste hierarchies. It cited academic scholarship suggesting that misogynistic violence is socially structured rather than random.

Image Source: OpIndia

The paper seemingly has an interpretative framework; it seems to present Hindu society in a negative light and makes sweeping generalizations about religious and social structures. The absence of empirical data and objected to parallels drawn between caste discrimination and apartheid is also blatant.

The controversy has also revived scrutiny of Tripathi’s earlier academic work and public commentary, which had previously drawn criticism from some commentators over her interpretations of religion, gender, and caste.

The institute has not issued an official statement on the matter at the time of publication.

Source: OpIndia

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Vijay Can’t Speak One Original Political Line, AIADMK Cooks TVK Chief Vijay’s ‘Copy-Paste’ Politics

By
The Commune
-
vijay eps aiadmk admk tvk madurai conference

The AIADMK on Friday launched a sharp attack on actor-turned-politician Vijay following his recent political speech, accusing him of lacking originality in both cinema and politics and of attempting to appropriate the legacy of established leaders.

In a social media post, the party ridiculed Vijay as “Panaiyur Pannaiyar,” alleging that he entered the film industry through his father’s influence and later built his screen persona by imitating established stars such as Rajinikanth and Vijayakanth.

The post further alleged that Vijay was attempting to replicate the political legacies of historical leaders from other parties rather than presenting original ideological positions.

Referring to recent political messaging, the AIADMK claimed that its General Secretary Edappadi K. Palaniswami had already spoken on the theme of the DMK being “out of control,” and accused Vijay of subsequently echoing the same line in his speech.

According to the party, Vijay had merely repeated talking points prepared by others and lacked the ability to independently articulate political views or critique historical legacies.

The AIADMK also took aim at Vijay’s fledgling political outfit, alleging that it was functioning like a “WhatsApp group” formed by inducting individuals rejected by other parties, while questioning his call for rival parties to dissolve and join him.

In its post, the party asserted its continued ideological allegiance to leaders such as Periyar, C.N. Annadurai, M.G. Ramachandran, and former Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa, stating that their legacy could not be appropriated for political positioning.

The statement additionally referenced Vijay’s earlier remark that he had played a supportive role like a squirrel in the establishment of Jayalalithaa’s rule and contrasted it with what it described as AIADMK’s restraint during periods of tragedy, citing political decorum followed by Palaniswami.

The attack concluded with a swipe at alleged first-day-first-show (FDFS) ticket pricing during Vijay’s film releases, sarcastically questioning whether selling tickets at inflated rates amounted to profiteering.

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Stalin’s ₹5,000 Payout Funded by Diverting SC/ST Welfare Money, Says AIADMK’s Kovai Sathyan

By
The Commune
-
Stalin’s ₹5,000 Payout Funded by Diverting SC/ST Welfare Money, Says AIADMK's Kovai Sathyan

On Friday, 13 February 2026, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister MK Stalin announced the disbursal of ₹5,000 to women beneficiaries under the Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thogai Thittam, presenting the move as part of his government’s continued commitment to women’s welfare ahead of the forthcoming Assembly elections.

According to the Chief Minister’s post on X, the ₹5,000 transfer covers three months, February, March, and April. Of this amount, ₹3,000 represents the regular monthly entitlement, while an additional ₹2,000 has been provided as a “summer special” assistance. Stalin stated that the amount had already been credited to 1.31 crore women enrolled under the scheme.

Framing the assistance as an entitlement rather than a welfare dole, the Chief Minister said the financial support was a pledge and a right of Tamil Nadu’s women. He also alleged that attempts were being made to delay the disbursal for three months citing the election schedule and claimed that his government had acted in advance to ensure uninterrupted payments. Stalin further announced that under a proposed “Dravidian Model 2.0,” the monthly assistance would be increased from ₹1,000 to ₹2,000.

Opposition Alleges Fund Diversion

However, the announcement drew criticism from the AIADMK, with party spokesperson Kovai Sathyan releasing a government document to allege that the disbursal was financed through diversion of funds earmarked for Scheduled Caste welfare components.

The document cited proceedings of the Social Welfare and Women Empowerment Department (Secretariat, Chennai-5), issued under an official file reference dated 22.12.2025.

According to the order, administrative sanction was accorded under the Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thogai Scheme (2025-26) by drawing funds linked to Special Component Plan allocations.

The file refers to approvals connected to:

  • Government sanction proceedings dated 03.11.2025 and 24.11.2025
  • Additional departmental approval dated 28.07.2025
  • Implementation under provisions of the Tamil Nadu Financial Code relating to re-appropriation.

Budget Heads Cited

A tabulated annexure in the document lists expenditure under Social Welfare budget classifications, including:

Demand No. 2235 – Social Security and Welfare

Head 02 – Social Welfare

Special Component Plan for Scheduled Castes – State Expenditure

Two specific sub-heads are cited:

789 – Special Component Plan for Scheduled Caste
Linked to Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Subsidies (AB-311)

Allocations shown:

  • 2023–2024: ₹2,41,95,16,2000
  • 2024–2025: ₹4,14,39,90,7000
  • 2025–2026: ₹4,14,16,72,2000

796 – Tribal Area Sub-Plan / Scheduled Tribe Component
Linked to Magalir Urimai Subsidies (JH-311)

Allocations shown:

  • 2023–2024: ₹1,61,30,11,000
  • 2024–2025: ₹2,73,05,57,000
  • 2025–2026: ₹2,76,11,15,000

The annexure records that these heads fall under Special Component / Tribal Sub-Plan structures meant for targeted welfare expenditure.

AIADMK’s Charge

Kovai Sathyan alleged that the government had utilized funds earmarked for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe development components to finance the Magalir Urimai Thogai disbursal, calling it a diversion of social justice allocations for electoral purposes.

He argued that Special Component Plan funds are intended for community-specific development outcomes and should not be repurposed for general cash transfer schemes and demanded transparency from the state government on the funding structure of the ₹5,000 payout.

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4 Rallies, 50 Deaths: The Troubling Record Of Public Safety At TVK Events

By
The Commune
-
"Vijay Fled From Scene Of Occurrence, Party Has No Remorse", Madurai Bench Of Madras High Court Slams TVK For dmk Karur Stampede karur stampede dmk

Actor-turned-politician and Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) chief Vijay’s political rally in Salem on Friday drew massive crowds but was marred by a death, alleged attacks on journalists, and renewed scrutiny over a series of fatalities linked to his public events over the past two years.

Death at Salem Rally

A 37-year-old man died after suffering a heart attack during the rally, police said.

Salem police officials identified the deceased as Suraj, a native of Maharashtra who had been residing in the Sevvaipettai area of Salem for work. He was engaged in silver-related labour and is survived by his wife and a child.

According to police, Suraj had attended the public meeting organised for TVK party administrators as a spectator. During the event, he suddenly collapsed and was rushed for medical assistance but was declared dead.

Officials said preliminary information pointed to a heart attack as the cause of death, adding that further inquiries were underway.

Fatalities at Previous TVK Events

The Salem death is not an isolated incident. Several fatalities have been reported in connection with Vijay’s rallies and conferences since 2024.

Vikravandi Conference – 27 October 2024

Six persons died in separate road accidents while travelling to attend TVK’s maiden public conference in Vikravandi. Those who died included advocate ‘Ghilli’ VL Srinivasan, youth wing leader JK Vijaykalai, and supporters Vasanthakumar, Riyaz, Udayakumar, and Charles, the latter reportedly due to breathing difficulties. Vijay expressed condolences to the families and prayed for the recovery of the injured.

Madurai State Conference – 21 August 2025

A 33-year-old supporter, Prabhakaran from Chennai, died after collapsing while travelling to attend TVK’s mega conference in Madurai. He was found unconscious near Chakkimangalam and later declared dead at the Government Rajaji Hospital.

In a separate incident linked to the same conference, an 18-year-old youth, Roshan from Kotagiri in the Nilgiris, died after experiencing suffocation amid heavy crowding at the venue. He was administered first aid but later suffered another bout of breathlessness while returning home and was declared dead at a hospital.

Karur Rally – 27 September 2025

A major stampede during Vijay’s rally in Karur claimed 41 lives, including children, casting a long shadow over large-scale mobilisations organised by the party.

Trichy Rally Drew Crowds, No Deaths

At TVK’s statewide campaign launch rally in Tiruchirappalli on 13 September 2025, massive crowds were reported, though no deaths were officially recorded.

The event, held under strict police conditions, saw supporters pushing barricades, climbing structures, and crowding along Vijay’s route. Medical teams reportedly attended to several attendees affected by heat and prolonged waiting, while fan surges caused significant traffic disruption across the city.

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How Centre-State Tax Devolution Really Works

By
Baskar
-
How Centre-State Tax Devolution Really Works

Debates around Centre–State finances frequently surface in the public domain, often framed as political flashpoints rather than fiscal questions grounded in data. Neutral and comprehensive explanations remain rare, with narratives typically shaped by partisan positions. This article attempts to bridge that gap by laying out the complete context and relevant data, enabling readers to assess the issue beyond the rhetoric.

Background

India is a large and diverse developing country and is the largest democratic federal republic. The country has a three-tier federal structure with governments at Union, States and Local levels. The Union list of Constitution gives power to the Central Government to levy taxes on income other than agriculture, Customs, Excise, Corporate Tax, GST on inter-state trade, etc.

The State Government has the power on land revenue, agricultural income tax, land and building tax, GST on intra-state trade, excise on alcohol, stamp duty, tax on minerals, electricity duty, etc.

To address any resultant fiscal imbalance, the sharing of central taxes with States and giving grants to States by Centre is envisaged. This is decided by an independent Finance Commission appointed by the President every five years. The task of the Commission includes recommending devolution of Central taxes to the States, laying down principles of distribution and shares of individual States. The Commission is also required to give grants and address any other matters entrusted to it in the interest of sound finance in the Presidential Terms of Reference.

In addition to the tax devolution and grants given to States based on recommendations of the Finance Commissions, the Central government gives specific purpose grants for various purposes through the respective ministries.

Central Spends

The nature of Centre’s spends can be classified as:

A. Centre’s Expenditure:

  1. Establishment Expenditure of the Centre
  2. Central Sector Schemes
  3. Other Central Expenditure, including those on CPSEs and Autonomous Bodies

B. Centrally Sponsored Schemes and other Transfers:

  • Centrally Sponsored Schemes
  • Finance Commission Transfers
  • Other transfers to States

Establishment Expenditure covers Salaries of Ministries (eg., Finance, Home, Health, Education, etc.) and their spends.

Central Sector Schemes (CS) are entirely funded by Government of India and implemented by the Central Agencies. In few cases it would be done through designated State implementing agencies. Major spends are fertiliser subsidy, Food subsidy, Defence outlays, Railway spends, NHAI, Road works, Metro projects, PM-Kisan, etc.

Other Central Expenditure includes provisions made for the Central Expenditure on CPSEs (Atomic Energy, Telecommunication, etc), Autonomous Bodies, Interest Payments, Repayment of Debt, Contributions to International Organizations etc

Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) includes those schemes which are funded and implemented by both the Centre and the States as per the approved sharing pattern (MGNREGA, Jal Jeevan, PMAY, etc).

Finance Commission Transfers are the transfers to States/UTs incl. grants for local bodies, SDRF, revenue deficit grants, etc.

Other Transfers to States include transfers to States made under National Disaster Relief Fund, Assistance for schemes under 1st proviso to Article 275(1) of the Constitution etc (Compensation Cess, Special Assistance, etc)

Apart from these, resources of public enterprises constitute the total expenditure profile of Centre.

XV Finance Commission

The Fifteenth Finance Commission (XV FC) for the period 2021-26, was chaired by N. K. Singh. It recommended states’ share in the divisible pool at 41% and devolution by States using criteria like income distance, population (2011), area, forest & ecology, demographic performance and tax effort.

The criteria and weightage assigned for the devolution formulae are:

The state wise share of devolution which was formulated by the Finance Commission is:

Tax Devolution by Criteria for Major States

Looking at the tax devolution by criteria for major states, you could see that the Income distance has the maximum weightage at 45% and represents the principle of equity as main criteria. Population and area share by State follows this at 15% weightage each. To reward demography performance (TFR), forest cover and tax / fiscal effort appropriate measures have been added.

Here, UP has got the maximum share most of the criteria in its favour amongst this group of states. Its low per capita income and its distance with the highest per capita state (Haryana) has the maximum inflence followed by its high population and area share.

2023-24 Actual devolution by State

In terms of the actual devolution for these major states for the year 2023-24, the table below captures the tax devolutions and other Finance commission transfers under the total transfers. Apart from this, the respective State Finance accounts tracks the direct transfers to State implementating agencies (thro’ PFMS). These transfers pertains to Subsidies, some of the CSS and CS schemes as explained above.

At per capita basis, these transfers (incl. that of direct transfers to SIAs) reflect that TN gets the maximum per capita transfers at Rs. 13,183 followed by Gujarat at Rs. 12,038. The own tax revenue as % of GSDP reflects the financial health of these States and is high for Telangana, Maharashtra followed by Uttar Pradesh. The quantum of transfers (excl. SIA) is highest at 55.5% for UP (reflecting the weightage shown above) followed by Gujarat (29%) and Tamil Nadu (27%).

Conclusion

These data above fairly reflect the balancing act and the principle of equity followed by Finance Commission for arriving at the tax devolution. These are typically called as general purpose funds and the transfers to SIAs are specific purpose funds. The myth that Tamil Nadu is unfairly treated by the Central Government is unfounded as the transfers are as per the independent finance commission and follows the detailed critera driven by equity and a fair distribution amongst States.

What could be looked at by XVI Finance commission is reducing the Cess collection used by Centre for specific purpose funds and other purposes and give more general-purpose funds to States driving autonomy

References
Appendix

Statement of Subsidies

Central Schemes


Central Expenditure

Baskar is a finance professional having keen interest in current affairs and Indian culture.

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‘He Slapped, Kicked Me, Served Him For 10 Years, Struggling For Food Now’: Vijay’s Former Aide Levels Serious Allegations Of Harassment And Abandonment

By
The Commune
-
‘He Slapped, Kicked Me’: Former Vijay Aide Levels Assault Allegation

Actor-turned-politician Vijay seems to be making headlines for all the wrong reasons. Be it his behaviour post-Karur stampede or how he does politics without leaving his Panaiyur home, how he avoids meeting with the press, how he indulges in offline chat that never gets recorded, here is one more addition to that list – not from the recent past but a detailed account of his alleged behaviour and subsequent alleged betrayal, as accused by a staff who worked with him and his dad SA Chandrasekhar for a long time.

From Loyal Assistant to Poverty

In an almost hour-long interview with a YouTube channel, Selvam (birth name Selvaraj) stated that he worked in the film industry for about 40 years, including around 10 years as Vijay’s personal assistant and many more as a production assistant for SA Chandrasekhar’s V.V. Creations. As stated, he handled core personal duties for Vijay on sets: arranging food, juice, coffee and meals, watching over his health routine, and staying constantly at his side like “an electric current” from early morning till late night. Trusting Vijay’s word that he would “never remove” him from work for others’ complaints, Selvam gave up general production jobs and tied his entire livelihood to serving Vijay alone. ​

Today, he says he cannot get regular work in cinema, survives only on occasional small assignments, and is weighed down by a 10‑lakh‑rupee loan for open‑heart surgery done after multiple heart attacks during film shoots. He lives in a rented house in Saligramam, is months behind on rent, moves around in a bicycle, and says his wife wears only a thread instead of a proper thali chain because of their financial distress.​

Humiliation, Violence and Isolation

Although Selvam repeatedly calls Vijay “a very soft‑natured” and punctual person in general, he narrates several episodes that, in his view, reveal a harsh and uncaring side to the star once he became “Thalapathy.” ​

Slapping and kicking in private: During the shooting of Puli at Talakona, Selvam says Vijay, angry after a phone call, finished dinner and then suddenly slapped him, threw a mirror, kicked him and vented his anger in a closed room at midnight when no one else could hear. “You think, he is Vijay, I am Selvam. Midnight 12. No one around,” he recalls, saying he fell onto the sofa in shock, unable to understand what mistake he had made. The next morning Vijay apologised, telling him, “He said openly: If I don’t hit you, I can’t go hit those people. You’re close to me. I hit you out of that closeness because you’ve been with me for many years.”​

Food incident and abrupt removal: During the shooting of Bairavaa, Selvam says Vijay found hair in his food, which Selvam believes was wig hair that someone else had placed it to frame him. Vijay inspected the dishes, got angry and finally told him: “Take this, wash the box, and go home. I’ll call you after 10 days.” Selvam was sent home in a car, without any compensation, and he says that “10 days” became a permanent exit from Vijay’s personal team.​

Hostility from the entourage: From the beginning of his PA tenure, Selvam says Vijay’s driver Rajendran and others in the coterie resented him and systematically tried to “cut him off.” They allegedly broke his umbrella on Thuppakki’s ship set, threw away juice straws to make him look careless, banged his door at night after drinking so he couldn’t sleep, and even physically assaulted him via others, while positioning themselves as the main gatekeepers to Vijay. When Selvam once tried to prevent junior‑artist agent Sengaiya from entering Vijay’s room against instructions, Sengaiya slapped him; only after a group of assistants protested did Vijay later intervene and scold the agent.​

Emotional blackmail and fear: Selvam describes how the constant harassment and eventual removal pushed him into depression and even a suicide attempt by consuming poison near Surya Hospital, from which a friend saved him. He says the stigma of “leaving such a big artist” led people to ask whether he had stolen something or committed some major mistake, further isolating him from work opportunities.​

Broken Promises and Lack of Support

A recurring thread in Selvam’s account is the feeling that Vijay broke a clear personal assurance and then failed to show even basic solidarity when the former aide’s life collapsed. ​

A promise not kept: At one stage, Selvam says Vijay told him explicitly: “Whoever says anything about you, I will never stop your work or send you away. You came trusting me.” Selvam reorganised his career around that promise, quitting broader production work to focus solely on Vijay’s needs. Yet after the hair‑in‑food incident, he was quietly removed from the PA role and never called back to that position.​

No help for surgery or debts: After years of service, Selvam suffered three major heart attacks while working on a Vijay film and underwent open‑heart surgery costing around 10 lakh rupees, funded entirely by high‑interest loans because hospitals refused to accept his government letters in time. He says he tried repeatedly to reach Vijay via TVK treasurer Venkat, and his children called too from the ICU, but “he never even picked up the phone,” and office/security staff blocked him at house, office and shooting spots.​

Token gestures vs long closeness: For his son’s wedding, Selvam personally invited Vijay on set during Sarkar and also invited SA Chandrasekhar, hoping for some help because the family was conducting the marriage through loans. Vijay did not attend or send any message, Chandrasekhar sent 2,000 rupees via office boy, and Vijay’s manager Ram gave 5,000. Selvam contrasts this with how, in Kuruvi days, he once injured himself badly while carrying juice over rocks, was bandaged and sent to hospital, and even then, the help he remembers is 10,000 given by Udhayanidhi Stalin and Shenbaga Moorthy, not by Vijay himself. ​

Shut out from work and reputation damage: Selvam says many producers assume “Vijay sir must have deposited money in your bank” and therefore avoid hiring him, believing he has secretly been settled by the star. In reality, he says, “If I take retirement benefits, it will all be gone in one moment; my family will be on the streets,” and he credits only the union and occasional small projects for keeping him barely afloat.​

Selvam Says His Conscience Knows The Truth

Selvam and Vijay are both Christians, and Selvam’s narrative often blends his Christian faith with his sense of betrayal. He recounts that even when he was accused over food incidents, he would say, “Only my Jesus knows whether it’s true or false,” stressing that he tried to keep his conscience clean in his work. His wife, also a Christian, repeatedly urged him not to speak against Vijay: “Let him act according to his nature. He has become busy; we shouldn’t trouble him,” and insisted they leave the matter to God rather than retaliate.​

Selvam contrasts this Christian ideal of compassion with the reality that a “fellow Christian” he served like family has not enquired whether he has one proper meal a day, even when his daughter became a widow and returned to his home. He recalls: “We are Christians; if someone wrongs us, we leave it to God; we don’t retaliate,” but adds that he is forced to speak now only because he is “struggling even for food” and hopes some help may reach his family. For him, the real test of faith is whether a man who speaks of ideals and justice will look down from his political and film heights and remember the worker who served him.​

Cinema Power, Workers and a Question to Vijay

Selvam situates his personal story within a larger critique of how star power and crores of rupees contrast with the insecurity of workers who wake at 4 AM to serve them. He asks whether Vijay has helped “even one cinema worker” from the crores he earned, pointing to lightmen who fall and die, drivers who work 24 hours, and production assistants who endure humiliation just to feed their families.

He recalls how MGR once took back a former personal staffer, gave him a home and told him, “A man who worked under MGR should not suffer under someone else,” and wonders whether today’s actors who invoke MGR’s legacy are willing to act with similar humanity.​

He also contrasts Vijay with Ajith, saying Ajith builds houses for his workers and supports their children’s medical and education needs, and remembers how Ajith once cooked biryani himself for all technicians on the Mankatha set and personally gave Selvam food. Though he says he likes Vijay, his son is a Vijay fan, and his wife still refuses to speak ill of him, he feels that “when he was Ilaya Thalapathy he was good; after becoming Thalapathy, he totally forgot,” and that living isolated from ordinary people has made Vijay insensitive to ground‑level suffering.​

In the end, Selvam’s story stands as a sharp moral question directed at Vijay: what does it mean for a Christian, cinema icon and now political leader to speak about justice, workers and MGR ideals, while a man who served his food for ten years cannot afford food, rent, or medicine?

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Why India’s Labour Code Overhaul Is A Game Changer For Jobs And Growth

By
Kamal Kumaraswami S
-
Why India’s Labour Code Overhaul Is A Game Changer For Jobs And Growth

India has been extremely fortuitous to come under resolute, innovative and visionary leadership since 2014, gradually marking a distinct break from the damage perpetuated during Congress regime in every domain.

The Congress regimes presided over outright administrative failure, leaving vital ministries such as the Ministry of Labour & Employment (MLE), Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) and Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) in a state of collapse due to dreadful mismanagement. Congress incompetence in governance peaked in the heedless institution of almost 29 garbled labour laws which reduced employment opportunities across the nation, ruined many MSMEs and pushed millions of employees into informal jobs.

The present government led by PM Narendra Modi has superseded and consolidated these 29 labour laws into four new, unified Labour Codes, and these codes came into effect on 21 November 2025. These reforms were made by scrapping the old system to create a simplified framework for wages, industrial relations, social security, and occupational safety for India’s working community.

Although labour and trade unions have raised concerns about potentially diluting worker rights, the central government claims that these reforms will enhance welfare and modernize labour regulations, employment practices, and broader worker protection; integrate workers across organised, unorganised, gig, and platform sectors under a common labour framework; and reflect India’s current economic conditions and growth trajectory.

Impact of Labour Law Reforms On Working Community

These historic labour law reforms announced by the central government consolidate different wage rules (Code on Wages, 2019), social security systems (Code on Social Security, 2020), industrial relations procedures (Industrial Relations Code, 2020), and workplace safety provisions (Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020).

This amalgamation extensively reduces legal complexity for both workers and employers. All unorganised or informal gig, contract, fixed-term, migrant, and platform workers will be able to avail themselves of or claim the following rights moving forward: wages, welfare schemes, benefits, social security, and work protection from their employers, similar to permanent employees in the organised sector. These provisions became mandatory for employers from 21 November 2025, and employers must comply thereafter.

Workers Legal Rights & Proof of Employment

Workers will now receive official appointment letters as documented proof of their employment terms, which will eventually reduce disputes over the position applied for, wages, and job conditions. This will prevent employers from arbitrarily terminating or exploiting workers or withholding pay or benefits simply because a worker was informally recruited. This inclusion strengthens the negotiating power and legal standing of the working community.

Wage Protection

For the first time in India, all workers across the country, regardless of sector or state of employment, are legally guaranteed a minimum wage, eliminating major wage disparities and inconsistencies across sectors.

Another inclusion is that wages must be paid within a stipulated time frame (the prior month’s salary to be paid by the 2nd, 5th, or 7th of the following month) along with a defined payslip. This ensures workers can see how their salary is structured, including the breakup of basic pay, allowances, overtime, loss of pay (LOP), etc. This provision enhances transparency and fairness and reduces financial stress among workers.

Social Security & Health/Risk Coverage

The incorporation of consistent safety, health, and welfare provisions in the recent reforms enhances workers’ dignity and well-being. This act encompasses crores of workers previously engaged in informal employment, granting them safety and legal recognition and enabling access to mandatory workmen’s compensation, retirement schemes, PF, ESI, pensions, gratuity, maternity benefits, and systematic leave entitlements that were earlier restricted to formal employees.

The OSH Code mandates that employers comply with health and safety norms nationwide. It requires employers to provide welfare amenities such as clean drinking water, adequate sanitation facilities, trained first-aid resources, restrooms, canteens, hazard communication displays, proper ventilation, lighting, and hygienic working conditions.

Work–Life Balance & Higher Pay

Employers cannot compel the workers to work lavishly long hours without their consent, as the workers should be having predictable time schedules that their families and personal lives can rely on. Daily and weekly work time ceilings are standardized. Typical working hours are limited to 8 hours per day and 48 hours per week. Overtime (work beyond these limits) can only be done with the worker’s consent, and the employers are mandated to compensate the overtime at statutory rates (twice the normal wage rate).

This specific measure discourages employers from pushing workers to work long hours, as the government wants to ensure that the workers are having adequate rest and weekly holidays. This reform gives workers leverage and reduces burnout, stress, and health issues tied to their work. This move is particularly beneficial for women, and it strengthens the balance between work and family time.

Uplifting Female Workforce Participation

This is one of the epoch-making reforms in India, as women are now legally empowered and entitled to work in all sectors, right from small shops on the streets to heavy industries with rotational shifts, including night shifts that were previously confined, restricted, and off the map for women, provided safety protocols are observed. These working provisions improve gender equality in employment and encourage more women to engage in diverse sectors.

Women will get to get access to lucrative roles, which will strengthen their financial independence. Employers are mandated to provide ample safety measures for women, such as transportation with security, well-lit workplaces, workstation security, and welfare facilities that are exclusive for women. These measures will lead to rise in female participation in the workforce and augment economic empowerment.

Impact on Indian Economy

These recent labour law reforms are significant for economic growth since the present central government overhauled and retouched a super stern and obdurate labour framework into a more streamlined and simplified system that nurtures productivity, fosters international and domestic investment, and promotes inclusive development. Engaging millions of informal workers in the formal system and providing them a healthy, secure workplace leads to increased productivity, reduced absenteeism and improved accuracy and integrity of India’s workforce as well as economic efficiency.

Increasing female workforce participation leads to broader economic development and helps meet the demographic objectives of Bharat. On the other hand, these reforms also improve ease of doing business, thereby attracting domestic and foreign investment. These reforms strengthen MSMEs and startups as these are engines of job creation in the country besides supporting faster industrial and manufacturing diversification and expansion. A more simplified, transparent, and uniform regulatory framework and common labour codes and practices across the nation will aid employers in having smooth business operations, thereby strengthening their competitiveness, and that will ultimately fuel economic growth.

Congress-Era Labour Law failure

Congress as a party with the collective absence of prescience and innovation created the most topsy-turvy, anti-economic and anti-labour laws that not only jolted the working community into informality but throttled employers in bureaucracy. Most policies designed under Congress were warpaint at best and deteriorating at worst and those made India’s labour market inflexible, pushing international investors to move to flexible labour markets like China, Indonesia and Vietnam. On the other hand, The BJP government introduced an innovative, simplified but comprehensive labour codes aligning with global best practices and that shows India’s preparedness for a competitive and inclusive labour market to the rest of the world.

Comparison of Labour Laws (Congress vs BJP)
Comparison of Labour Laws (Congress vs BJP)
Conclusion

These new labour reforms across the board mark one of India’s most sweeping transformations in the work culture since these new reforms are systematizing employment, regulating wages, methodizing work hours, reinforcing the safety norms, and dilating opportunities for women in all the sectors. These reforms impulse India’s transition toward a more comprehensive, impartial, and global-ready labour framework. These reforms will remarkably uplift the status, patronage, contemplation, and security of crores of workers across Bharat. These new reforms not only empowered the workers but have also simplified and optimized employer responsibilities as groundwork for resilient growth model competent in succoring long-term national progress with a fertile and robust economy.

Kamal Kumaraswami is an advocate and writer.

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