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Another Hindu Beaten To Death In Mobocracy Bangladesh Days After Dipu Chandra Das Was Lynched And Set Ablaze

Bangladesh has witnessed another fatal mob assault involving a Hindu man, coming just days after the lynching of Dipu Chandra Das, whose killing triggered widespread outrage. According to local media reports on Thursday, a 29-year-old man identified as Amrit Mondal, also known as Samrat, was beaten to death in the Pangsha area of Rajbari district, roughly three and a half hours from Dhaka.

Residents told The Daily Star that Samrat was believed to be the head of a local criminal group known as “Samrat Bahini,” allegedly engaged in extortion and other illegal activities. He had reportedly left Bangladesh following the removal of Sheikh Hasina last year and had returned recently to his native village of Hosendanga in Kalimohor union.

The incident reportedly took place around 11 pm on Wednesday when Samrat and several associates went to the home of a villager, Shahidul Islam, allegedly to demand money. Family members raised an alarm, accusing the group of robbery, prompting nearby villagers to intervene. While most of the group managed to escape, Samrat was caught and beaten by the crowd.

Assistant Superintendent of Police Debrata Sarkar of the Pangsha Circle said officers managed to pull Samrat from the mob and rushed him to a hospital, where doctors pronounced him dead. Police confirmed that Samrat had multiple cases pending against him at Pangsha police station, including a murder charge. One of his associates, Mohammad Selim, was arrested during follow-up operations, and police recovered a pistol and another firearm.

The killing has further heightened tensions in Bangladesh, where concerns over minority safety have intensified following the recent lynching of Dipu Chandra Das, a 27-year-old factory worker in Mymensingh. Das was attacked last Thursday after a co-worker accused him of blasphemy. A mob reportedly beat him to death, hung his body, and set it on fire.

The murder sparked protests and condemnation both within Bangladesh and abroad, including demonstrations in India. Authorities later stated that there was no evidence supporting the blasphemy allegation and suggested the violence may have stemmed from a workplace dispute. At least 12 individuals have been arrested in connection with Das’s killing.

Bangladesh’s Education Adviser, Professor C R Abrar, visited Das’s family earlier this week to offer condolences. Interim government chief adviser Muhammad Yunus said in a social media post that the visit was intended to convey the government’s sympathy and its commitment to supporting the bereaved family.

Source: NDTV

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How Tamil Nadu Has Decayed Under Dravidian Model

Tamil Nadu, once hailed as a pioneer in infrastructure development and governance innovation, stands today as a case study in unfulfilled potential. Despite decades of Dravidian political dominance and claims of the “Dravidian Model” being a beacon for other states, the reality on the ground tells a starkly different story of mounting debts, crumbling infrastructure, and misplaced priorities.

Highway Dreams, Expressway Reality

Tamil Nadu was indeed an early pioneer in highway development, with the East Coast Road being the first project implemented by Tamil Nadu Road Development Company in 2002. However, the state’s expressway ambitions have remained largely on paper. The much-touted Chennai Port-Maduravoyal Expressway, announced with great fanfare in 2007, has been mired in delays and cost escalations. What began as a ₹1,468 crore project has now ballooned to ₹5,770 crore, with construction repeatedly stalled due to government interference and bureaucratic hurdles and has been put on hold.

The state’s first claimed “10-lane expressway” – the Chennai Peripheral Ring Road – is expected to open only by January 2026 at a cost of ₹12,301 crore. Meanwhile, states like Gujarat and Maharashtra have built extensive expressway networks, leaving Tamil Nadu lagging behind despite its early start.

Transport Corporations: A Financial Catastrophe

The state transport sector exemplifies the failures of the Dravidian model. Tamil Nadu’s eight transport corporations are drowning in debt that has tripled from ₹6,467 crore in 2017 to ₹21,980 crore currently. The monthly deficit has reached ₹566 crore, with accumulated losses doubling from ₹24,718 crore in 2018 to ₹48,478 crore by 2022.​

The CAG report reveals a damning picture: over 1,000 government buses are discarded annually, but only one-third are replaced, reducing the fleet size to 20,600 by 2022. Despite employing 1.2 lakh drivers and conductors whose salaries exceed those in neighboring Karnataka, inefficiency and underutilization plague the system. The government’s response has been to pour more money into a failing system rather than addressing structural issues.

Power Sector: The TANGEDCO Disaster

Perhaps nowhere is the failure of the Dravidian model more evident than in the power sector. TANGEDCO, with accumulated losses of ₹1.62 lakh crore as of 2022-23, holds the dubious distinction of recording the highest accumulated losses among all state power distribution companies in India. The utility’s debt has tripled from ₹43,493 crore in 2011-12 to ₹1,59,823 crore by 2022.​

The cross-subsidy model, where industrial and commercial consumers subsidize domestic and agricultural users, has reached unsustainable levels. Over 8.62 lakh consumers owe more than ₹5,132 crore in unpaid bills, yet the government continues to provide free power to farmers and heavily subsidized electricity to domestic consumers. The interest payment alone on TANGEDCO’s loans increased by 259% from ₹4,588 crore in 2011-12 to ₹16,511 crore in 2021-22.

Aviation: From Pioneer to Laggard

Tamil Nadu’s aviation sector, despite its rich history dating back to 1911, has failed to keep pace with modern demands. Chennai Airport operates like a “bus stand,” plagued by inadequate infrastructure, insufficient aerobridges, and poor design. The airport has only four aerobridges at the international terminal, forcing airlines to use remote bays and shuttle buses, creating operational nightmares.​

The long-promised Parandur second airport faces environmental challenges and local opposition, while the Hosur airport remains stuck in bureaucratic processes with BIAL’s objections and defense clearance issues. Meanwhile, Bangalore has leveraged its superior airport infrastructure to attract more international flights and business.​

IT Industry: The Lost Leadership

Tamil Nadu’s IT sector decline is particularly telling. Once the second-largest IT hub after Bangalore, Chennai has now fallen behind Pune and Hyderabad. Microsoft closed its Chennai office, and many companies are moving operations to Bangalore or Hyderabad due to better infrastructure, talent availability, and business environment.​

The reasons are systemic: poor urban infrastructure, inadequate water supply in IT corridors like OMR, conservative social environment, and limited entertainment options compared to Bangalore and Hyderabad. The state government’s focus on manufacturing over services has contributed to this decline.​

Urban Infrastructure: Drainage and Roads Crisis

Chennai’s drainage system, despite investments of over ₹1,387 crore in stormwater drains, continues to fail during heavy rains. The 2015 floods exposed the inadequacy of urban planning, and subsequent flooding events have shown little improvement. Only 65% of the city’s road length has drainage networks, leaving expanded areas vulnerable.​

Road infrastructure across the state remains abysmal. In Coimbatore, despite ₹400 crore allocation for road repairs, large portions remain broken with potholes and trenches making daily commutes hazardous. The Chennai-Bangalore highway is particularly notorious for its poor condition, forcing travelers to seek alternative routes.

The Great Distraction: Symbolism Over Substance

While Chennai’s drains choke under 40 cm of rain and its roads disintegrate, what dominates political debate? The abolition of surnames and the relentless courting of film personalities.

This is not to say social justice is unimportant. The Dravidian movement was built on a powerful and necessary agenda of social emancipation. But that agenda has been hollowed out. It has been reduced to a political tool, a convenient smokescreen to distract from a comprehensive administrative failure. True social justice is not just about identity; it is about access to quality jobs, reliable infrastructure, clean water, and a government that is accountable for delivering basic services.

The people of Tamil Nadu are not asking for the moon. They are asking for working hand pumps that don’t spew sewage, for roads that aren’t death traps, for an economy that retains its best minds, and for a government that spends more time fixing drains than handing out awards.

The “Dravidian Model”, in its current form, has pushed the state behind. It has traded a legacy of bold, tangible achievement for a present of fiscal decay and infrastructural stagnation. Until we shift the political conversation back to these pressing developmental issues, until we demand answers and accountability, we risk remaining stuck in the past, talking about the glories of a century ago while our future slips away.

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Welcome To Dravidian Model Tamil Nadu: Christian And Muslim Canvassing Is ‘Secular’; Hindus Voting BJP Is ‘Communal’

Secularism in India has been turned into a caste‑coded weapon, not a principle. When Christian clergy and minority networks openly choreograph votes for “secular” fronts, Dravidianist and Left‑liberal media call it enlightened resistance; when Hindus talk to Hindus about political power, the very same ecosystem screams “communal polarisation” and demands censorship.

​Christmas As Campaign Rally, But “Not Communal”

Walk through Tamil Nadu’s Christmas events this year and you see the new template: Christmas trees, carols, and from the same stage, explicit political messaging about who minorities must back in 2026 to “save Tamil Nadu from fascism.”

​Outlets dissect how Christian votes might swing between Stalin and Vijay, calmly discussing “which leader will win the Christian vote in 2026,” as if entire congregations are a negotiable bloc to be auctioned between Dravidian and TVK formations.

​Pastors and “community leaders” urge Christians and Muslims to “stand with the secular front” and “keep fascists out of Tamil Nadu,” and this is reported in soft language: “minority outreach,” “confidence building,” “assurances to vulnerable communities.” There is no screaming about “religion in politics,” no prime‑time lectures on “dangerous communal consolidation.”

​We saw this recently with DMK chief MK Stalin and TVK chief Vijay’s ‘Christmas’ celebration events.

Now contrast this with how the same media reacts if a Hindu religious figure so much as hints that Hindus should vote as Hindus.

One Rule For Churches, Another For Temples

When Christian pastors openly frame 2026 as a battle between “secular forces” and “fascists,” and call on their flock to vote “as a community” for one side, the media sees it as perfectly legitimate “political awareness.”

​Editorials call these speeches “assertions of constitutional rights” and “minority self‑defence,” even when they are clearly religious platforms being used for electoral mobilisation.

When minority umbrella groups announce they will collectively support a “secular front,” TOI‑style headlines blandly say “Minority groups to back ‘secular’ alliance,” as if this is simply good, rational politics.

​But let a Hindu priest, head of a Hindu organisation, or a pravachaka urge Hindus to vote for a party that promises to protect temples, festivals or cows, and the outrage machine detonates.

A temple priest somewhere in the country once appealed for votes for the BJP and was instantly painted as a symbol of theocratic danger; complaint letters, secular op‑eds and “this is not the India our founders envisioned” or “this is not the India I grew up in” pieces followed.

When Hindu groups in Tamil Nadu talk of consolidating devotees over issues like temple control or the  Thirupparankundram/Karthigai Deepam dispute, Dravidian‑aligned media frame it as “saffron polarisation,” “Ayodhya‑isation of Tamil Nadu,” and an assault on the Dravidian model.

So, the rule is clear: church mobilisation is “secular defence”; temple mobilisation is “communal aggression.” The content is often similar, religious leaders nudging their flock towards a specific party, but the media labels flip 180 degrees based purely on which side benefits.

How Dravidianist Media Launders Communal Vote‑Bank Politics

Dravidianist outlets have built an entire vocabulary to sanitise minority vote‑bank politics while demonising Hindu consolidation.

When Christian forums declare support for one front, the language is “protecting pluralism,” “blocking majoritarianism,” or “standing with secular forces.” No one asks why religious identity is being turned into a monolithic political currency.

Coverage of minority rallies routinely emphasises “fear” and “vulnerability”: the narrative is that these communities are forced to vote as a block to survive, so their religiously framed appeals deserve empathy, not scrutiny.

Yet the same media caricatures Hindu consolidation as primitive herd behaviour. Here are some examples:

If Hindus speak of “Hindu interests,” “temple autonomy,” or “demographic concerns,” they are instantly equated with “Hindu Rashtra,” “Talibanisation,” and “majoritarian fascism,” even when their demands are about parity, having at least the same political agency that churches and mosques exercise everyday.

Dravidian leaders can stand at publicly funded Christmas events and hint that minorities must ensure a “secular government” remains in Fort St. George, and anchors nod along as if this is a neutral civic message rather than naked religious bloc‑building.

​This is nothing but laundering. It normalises one set of communal appeals, those that help the Dravidian‑Left alliance, while pathologising any Hindu attempt to act like a political community.

The Pre‑Packaged BJP Villain Script

No matter what the BJP actually says on a given day, the script is pre‑written: communal, divisive, dangerous for minorities.

When the BJP talks about temple control, media frame it as a sinister plot to “saffronise institutions,” but the century‑old church‑run education and welfare network entering politics is treated as just “civil society participation.”

When BJP leaders speak to Hindu audiences about voting power, they are accused of “weaponising faith”; when minority clergy openly call for defeating the BJP from pulpits, it is defended as “speaking truth to power.”

The hypocrisy is laid bare in election cycles. Articles calmly explain how Christian votes will be “crucial to keep BJP at bay” in southern states, without once describing this as communal engineering, even though the entire premise is that one religious group must block another group’s party.

But if a BJP strategist openly says, “Hindus must unite,” that one line will be replayed endlessly as proof of a creeping theocracy.

In other words, Hindu consolidation is automatically guilty, minority consolidation is automatically virtuous. That is not secularism; that is ideological bigotry.

What Equal Secularism Would Actually Look Like

If secularism genuinely applied equally, three basic standards would hold:

Same yardstick for all religious mobilisation – Any explicit vote appeal made from a pulpit—church, mosque or temple—would be described as communal and subjected to the same scrutiny, not excused as “secular resistance” in one case and demonised in another.

Same language for bloc politics – If media can calmly discuss “the Christian vote” or “the Muslim vote,” then talking about “the Hindu vote” cannot be treated as automatically illegitimate; either all are problematic, or all are recognised as real political behaviour.

Same suspicion of state–religion nexus – When governments use state platforms, grants, or commissions to signal partisan alignment to any religious community, that should trigger alarm, whether it is a minority commission head promising votes to a ruling party or a Hindu board doing the same. The outrage cannot depend solely on which party benefits.

Until these standards are applied, what passes for “secular critique” in much of Leftist and Dravidianist media is simply a caste‑coded club: used relentlessly to beat the BJP and any Hindu voice that refuses to remain politically fragmented, while turning a blind eye. or even clapping, when churches and minority organisations play raw, overt communal politics in the name of protecting secularism

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Pro-Congress Leftist Rag The Wire Frames A Burial Dispute Between Christian Family And Non-Converted Tribal Villagers Into A Hindutva Hate Narrative

A ‘report’ published by leftist rag The Wire on 20 December 2025, on violence following a burial dispute in Chhattisgarh’s Kanker district has drawn criticism for what detractors describe as selective framing and omission of key facts that materially alter the context of the incident.

The Wire’s article headlined “Chhattisgarh: Mob Torches Christian Home, Churches Over Burial Dispute; Survivor Alleges Hindutva Role,” foregrounded allegations by a Christian family that “Hindutva groups” were responsible for the violence, repeatedly using language that portrayed the incident as a targeted attack on Christians driven by ideological hostility.

The article relied heavily on survivor testimony and activist statements, while attributing the escalation primarily to the involvement of organisations such as the RSS and Bajrang Dal.

However, contemporaneous reporting by The Hindu presented a more layered account, situating the violence within a complex local dispute involving burial practices, tribal customs, conversion-related tensions, and intra-village rivalries. According to The Hindu, the deceased father of village sarpanch Rajman Salam had not converted to Christianity, and the burial was conducted according to Christian rites on village land despite objections rooted in long-standing tribal customs. The paper also reported that villagers formally complained to the administration, leading to a legally sanctioned exhumation order by an Executive Magistrate.

Crucially, The Hindu’s report noted that the situation involved clashes between villagers themselves, stone-pelting, injuries to police personnel, and property damage during efforts to maintain order, facts that complicate a simplistic framing of the violence as a one-sided, ideologically driven attack. Senior police officials cited by The Hindu stated that the exhumation was ordered under legal provisions following villagers’ complaints and that the administration had attempted mediation before violence broke out.

By centring the narrative almost entirely on “Hindutva violence” and downplaying the role of tribal customs, administrative orders, and local disputes, including allegations that political rivalry played a role, The Wire reduced a multifaceted law-and-order situation into a binary communal storyline. The leftist rag which positions itself as an advocate for ‘human rights’, leave alone tribal rights, did not sufficiently reflect tribal perspectives that opposed the burial on customary grounds, thereby marginalising those voices in favour of a predetermined ideological frame.

The article’s reliance on allegations without equivalent scrutiny of countervailing accounts, particularly when official police statements acknowledged injuries to more than 20 personnel and described the events as “clashes among villagers.” Such omissions mislead readers by presenting allegation as established fact.

The divergence between the two reports has fuelled a broader debate on editorial responsibility and narrative balance, especially in conflict reporting involving religion, tribal customs, and local governance. Serious incidents of violence warrant comprehensive coverage that reflects all material facts and perspectives, rather than selective emphasis that aligns with a particular political or ideological outlook.

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Suryanarayana Sastri: The Brahmin Professor Who First Called Tamil As A Classical Language

Suryanarayana Sastri (1870–1903), was a Madras Christian College professor and early Tamil patriot better known by his Tamil pen name “Parithimar Kalaignar.” He was one of the first modern scholars to argue that Tamil is a “classical language” and not a mere vernacular, and his work helped seed later Tamil-pride movements.

Early Life And Education

VG Suryanarayana Sastri was born on 6 July 1870 in Vilacheri, near Thirupparankundram in the Madurai region, in a Tamil Brahmin family. His father Govinda Sivan (also referred to as Govinda Sastrikal) taught him Sanskrit, while his grounding in Tamil came from the scholar Sabapathi Mudaliar, giving him an unusual early bilingual depth in both classical Sanskrit and Tamil. This dual training shaped him into a bridge figure: fully conversant with Sanskritic learning yet emotionally and intellectually committed to arguing for the autonomy and antiquity of Tamil.

After schooling in Madurai, he proceeded to Madras Christian College (MCC), where he formally studied Tamil and graduated in 1892, reportedly topping the university in the subject. At a time when salaried academic positions in humanities were limited and heavily Anglocentric, a young Brahmin graduate specializing in Tamil rather than English or philosophy already marked a quiet but significant deviation from the colonial-era norm.

Academic Career At Madras Christian College

In 1893, the influential MCC principal William Miller offered Suryanarayana Sastri a post in the Department of Philosophy, which carried a higher salary and greater prestige. Sastri, however, insisted on serving as a Tamil professor, choosing ideological commitment over career advantage, and became one of the earliest graduates to accept a full-time post teaching Tamil. By 1895 he had risen to head the Tamil department at MCC, positioning himself at the heart of emerging modern Tamil studies in the Madras Presidency.

From this institutional base he pushed for curricular recognition of Tamil as a serious academic field, not a marginal “vernacular” add-on. He worked with like‑minded colleagues such as MS Purnalingam Pillai, an English professor at MCC, to resist moves within the University of Madras to downgrade or remove Tamil from higher education syllabi.

The OG Of Tamil Identity Politics

Born with the Sanskritic name “Suryanarayana Sastri,” he became famous under the Tamilized name “Parithimar Kalaignar,” often also called “Dravida Sastri.” “Parithi” corresponds to “Surya” (sun) and “Kalaignar” to “artist/scholar,” so the Tamil pen name mirrored the original Sanskrit meaning.

While sectarian forces project this name change as some sort of resistance against Sanskrit, Suryanarayana Sastri himself continued to use his original name in academic writings and official records.

The commemorative stamp issued by the Government of India also bears the name Suryanarayana Sastri.

Parithimar Kalaignar - Wikipedia

His adoption and use of a Tamil name became an effective symbol to elevate the status of Tamil and not peddle hate against another language.

Campaign For Tamil As A Classical Language

Suryanarayana Sastri is widely credited as the first modern scholar to explicitly argue that Tamil deserved recognition as a “classical language.” In 1901, with support from Prince Pandi Thurai Thevar and the Madurai Tamil Sangam, he helped establish an academy for Tamil often referred to as the “Fourth Tamil Sangam,” which became an institutional platform for Tamil scholarship and advocacy.

The academy’s monthly journal “Senthamizh” carried, in its inaugural issue, his research article “Uyar Thani Semmozhi,” where he articulated a sustained argument that Tamil possessed the antiquity, rich literature, and independent grammatical tradition needed to be ranked as a classical language rather than a low-status vernacular. In 1902 he reportedly sent a petition urging that Tamil be formally classified as a classical language and objected to the University of Madras using the label “vernacular” for Tamil, a move that prefigured by a century the official Government of India recognition of Tamil as a classical language in 2004.

Resistance To Marginalisation Of Tamil In Education

Around 1902, the University of Madras, then the only university in the region, considered removing Tamil as a subject from college curricula or at least reducing its status. Suryanarayana Sastri, together with allies like Purnalingam Pillai, mounted a strong intellectual and institutional opposition to this move, arguing that Tamil had to remain present at the college level as a full-fledged subject of study. Their efforts are credited with forcing the authorities to drop or dilute the proposal and helped secure Tamil a continuing place within higher education.

Beyond defensive battles, Sastri promoted Tamil’s integration into undergraduate courses at MCC and elsewhere, working to normalize the idea that modern educated elites could study and develop Tamil just as seriously as they did English, philosophy or science. This curricular embedding of Tamil undercut the colonial-era hierarchy that treated English as the language of reason and advancement and Tamil as merely a medium for folklore or basic literacy.

Writings, Research And Literary Contributions

Suryanarayana Sastri wrote extensively across genres: research articles, essays, textbooks and creative works. Apart from his Tamil essays, he authored an English novel or novella, “Rupavathi, or, The Missing Daughter,” published in 1895 from a Madras press, which indicates his comfort moving between languages and audiences. His scholarly writings frequently addressed issues of Tamil grammar, literary history and the relationship between Tamil and Sanskrit, identifying both Sanskrit influence on Tamil and the distinctiveness and depth of Tamil’s own classical corpus.

Within the early Tamil purist and linguistic reform milieu, he is often placed alongside figures like GU Pope and JM Nallaswami Pillai on the one hand, and Tamil purists such as Maraimalai Adigal on the other, as part of a generation that created modern philological tools for thinking about Tamil. Later scholars note that Maraimalai Adigal, who would become a leading proponent of “pure Tamil,” respected Suryanarayana Sastri for his devotion to Tamil, even though their approaches to Sanskrit and religious tradition were not identical.

Legacy And Memory In Contemporary Tamil discourse

Suryanarayana Sastri died relatively young on 2 November 1903, which limited the volume of his mature output but did not prevent his ideas from reverberating through later decades. His early articulation of Tamil as a classical language, institutional interventions in university policy, and adoption of a Tamil name gave later generations of Tamil nationalists and Dravidian ideologues both arguments and symbols to draw upon.

In present‑day Tamil Nadu, school social‑science textbooks present him as one of the earliest scholars to insist on the classical status of Tamil and to reject the “vernacular” label, often using his name-change story as a classroom illustration of linguistic pride. Public commemorations on his birth anniversaries, particularly in Madurai and among Tamil scholarly groups, emphasize his efforts in founding the “Fourth Tamil Sangam” and his role in the long trajectory that culminated in official recognition of Tamil as a classical language.

A Counter-Current To Dravidian Separatist Undercurrents

Historians of the Tamil purist movement and the broader Dravidian ideological sphere often identify Suryanarayana Sastri as a foundational figure. K Kailasapathy and others point out that leaders of the later “tanittamil” (pure Tamil) movement had close links with earlier scholars like Sundaram Pillai and Suriyanarayana Sastri, whose work in grammar, textual editing and language history laid the groundwork for later purist demands.

At the same time, his own positionality – a Brahmin professor comfortable with Sanskrit and Western academic methods, differs from the strongly anti‑Brahmin, anti‑Sanskritic rhetoric of later Dravidian politics. This creates an interesting tension: he is retrospectively celebrated as an ancestor of Tamil linguistic nationalism while having inhabited a more hybrid cultural space where Sanskrit, English and Tamil all coexisted in his intellectual world.

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Dravidian Stock Tamil Cinema Reviewer Kalilur Rahman Attacks Sanatana Dharma In His “Roast” Of Balayya’s Akhanda 2

Tamil film reviewer Kalilur Rahman has sparked controversy after launching a sharp religious attack on Sanatana Dharma while reviewing the recently released Telugu film Akhanda 2: Thaandavam, branding his commentary as a “Sanatana Sanghi Roast.”

In his review, Rahman alleged that the film was deliberately constructed to appeal to North Indian audiences by embedding what he described as overt Hindutva symbolism throughout its narrative. He claimed that references to cows, Sanatana Dharma, and national political imagery were inserted repeatedly “across the entire running length of the film, like a pickle one keeps dipping into.”

Referring to specific scenes, Rahman said that cows appeared prominently throughout the film, including a sequence where the Prime Minister is shown caressing a cow. He further pointed to scenes in the protagonist’s household where a cow is treated “like a member of the family,” receiving affection and reverence. According to him, the film “proudly talks about Sanatana Dharma” but selectively avoids discussing what he characterised as its hierarchical elements.

Rahman argued that while the film celebrates Sanatana Dharma symbolically, it allegedly omits references to caste hierarchy. Citing the Manusmriti, he claimed that the film “forgot to explain” divisions based on birth, remarking sarcastically about depictions of people born from the head, shoulders, and feet being placed in a rigid hierarchy. He accused the filmmakers of selectively portraying religious concepts while avoiding aspects that could invite criticism.

During the review, Rahman also played a clip from the film featuring lead actor Nandamuri Balakrishna, who is seen saying, “I am not an educated man. I will only say what I know.” Rahman used the line to reinforce his argument that the film openly embraces what he called a “Sanghi agenda.”

He further alleged that references to Hindutva politics and Sanatana Dharma were inserted even where the story did not demand them. “Whether the story needs it or not, in every single scene they somehow drag it in and connect it to Hindutva politics or to Sanatana Dharma,” he said.

The review, released under the thumbnail “Sanatana Sanghi Roast,” has triggered backlash on social media, with critics accusing Rahman of using film criticism as a vehicle for attacking Hindu religious beliefs. Supporters of the film argue that such commentary reflects a broader pattern in Tamil Nadu’s cultural discourse, where criticism of Sanatana Dharma and Hindu traditions often draws little consequence.

Akhanda 2: Thaandavam, directed as a sequel to the 2021 film Akhanda, was released in cinemas on 12 December 2025 after its original 5 December release date was postponed. The film stars Nandamuri Balakrishna in a dual role as Akhanda Rudra Sikandar Aghora and Murali Krishna, with Samyuktha Menon as the female lead, Aadhi Pinisetty as the primary antagonist, and Harshaali Malhotra in a key role.

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‘Baseless And Foolish’ – That’s How The Wire Dismissed Hindu Fears In Bangladesh Following The Coup

A 2024 video interview featuring senior journalist Siddharth Varadarajan and Arfa Khanum Sherwani, published by The Wire, has resurfaced amid renewed scrutiny, as a series of violent incidents targeting Hindu minorities continue to be reported from Bangladesh.

The interview was recorded during the period of political turmoil in Bangladesh when the Army assumed control following unrest. In the conversation, Varadarajan dismissed concerns being raised about the safety of Hindus and Christians in Bangladesh, describing such claims as unfounded.

Responding to Sherwani’s question about the fate of religious minorities, he said: “All this, all this, all this is baseless and foolish talk.” Earlier in the exchange, Varadarajan stated, “If you look closely at the incidents of the last two–three days, this entire movement is not in the hands of the army. Nor is it that—although in right-wing circles in India people are saying that now Bangladesh will directly fall under the sway of Islamic fanaticism—various kinds of speculations are being made, all sorts of allegations are being levelled.”

The remarks have come under renewed attention as Bangladesh has witnessed repeated incidents of violence against Hindus in the months following the 2024 political upheaval. Reports from multiple locations have documented attacks on Hindu homes, vandalism of temples, targeted violence during religious festivals, and incidents of arson. Most recently, a Hindu factory worker in Bangladesh was lynched by a mob over allegations of blasphemy; police later stated that no evidence was found to substantiate the accusation.

It is important to note that the violence has not been confined to isolated episodes but has continued across different periods and regions, raising concerns among rights groups and community representatives.

How The Wire Peddled Pakistani Propaganda During Op Sindoor

Their downplaying and Islamist appeasement knows no bounds. More recently, following the Pahalgam terror attack in April 2025, that was followed by India’s precision strikes on terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir under Operation Sindoor, criticism has emerged over the editorial stance adopted by The Wire during its coverage of the operation.

During a broadcast on The Wire, journalist Arfa Khanum Sherwani questioned the outcome of the operation, stating, “We do not want bloodshed… Pakistan says that many of its civilians were killed and of course there were not terrorists who died.” The remarks echoed claims made by Pakistani authorities, despite the absence of independent verification at the time. These comments repeated Islamabad’s narrative without reference to official Indian briefings or available evidence.

Editor Siddharth Varadarajan did not publicly challenge the assertions during the broadcast. He instead said, “We must tell them don’t worry, we are there for you… when two countries which have a historical and cultural connection… a war must not happen between them.”

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Inside Congress’ Foreign Network: Soros Links, Foreign NGOs, Media Operations And The Threat To National Security

A series of social-media disclosures, OSINT-based threads, and political allegations circulating in late 2025 have reignited an intense debate over the Indian National Congress’s foreign engagements, its alleged proximity to international activist networks, and claims of a coordinated media-narrative ecosystem operating both within and outside India.

At the centre of these claims is Rahul Gandhi, Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, whose foreign travels, closed-door meetings, and associations with individuals and organisations linked to billionaire philanthropist George Soros have drawn sharp scrutiny from political critics and security commentators.

The allegations, advanced primarily by independent OSINT researchers and amplified through social-media platforms, assert the existence of a structured network involving foreign-funded NGOs, think tanks, journalist-training organisations, and ideological advocacy groups, which allegedly intersect with Congress party interests and messaging, particularly in relation to criticism of the Modi government and India’s national-security policies.

I. The Foundational Allegation: A Systemic Muslim Network Leverage

The core part of this is that the Congress party systematically partners with and lands at the door of Muslim-led organizations to build its narrative and operational infrastructure. Key figures and organizations cited include:

  • FactShala/DataLeads: Linked to Syed Nazakat.
  • GFMD (Global Forum for Media Development) & PROTO Network: Linked to Nasr ul Hadi.
  • Hindus for Human Rights (HfHR): Led by Rashid Ahmed, noted as a regular feature in Rahul Gandhi and Overseas Congress meetings.
  • Other Creations: The network allegedly includes individuals like Arfa Khanam and the late Mohammed Zubair.

The charge is that this represents a deliberate political strategy by the Congress to build a leveraged network, with critics questioning the silence of those who overlook this alleged game.

II. The Pangong Tso Episode: A Security Conundrum

A focal point of concern is Rahul Gandhi’s August 2023 Ladakh bike trip to Pangong Tso lake, a militarily sensitive flashpoint on the India-China border. Investigations have centered on one of his companions, Shakir Mohamed Nurali Merali, a Kenyan citizen and Managing Partner for Africa at global investment firm Lightrock.

The Soros Connection:

Lightrock’s Indian platform originated as Aspada Investment Company, wholly created and funded by the Soros Economic Development Fund (SEDF).

Although acquired by Liechtenstein’s LGT Group in 2019 and rebranded, legal documents from 2021 show Lightrock India and SEDF as co-investors, indicating an ongoing institutional relationship.

This link gained scrutiny in March 2025 when the Enforcement Directorate (ED) raided Open Society Foundations and SEDF-linked locations in Bengaluru over alleged foreign exchange violations.

The Abraaj Group Past:

Prior to Lightrock, Merali was a Managing Director at The Abraaj Group, a Dubai-based private equity firm founded by Pakistani businessman Arif Naqvi, which collapsed in 2018 amid fraud allegations.

During his tenure, Abraaj was the majority owner of K-Electric, Pakistan’s largest power utility. In 2016, Abraaj agreed to sell K-Electric to Shanghai Electric Power, a Chinese state-owned company, for $1.77 billion – a deal that would have placed critical Pakistani infrastructure under Beijing’s control.

A Pakistani judicial commission alleged Abraaj offered a $20 million bribe to then-PM Nawaz Sharif and his brother to push the deal.

Abraaj was also implicated in channeling foreign corporate money into Pakistani politics, including a transfer of an identical sum to Imran Khan’s PTI party on the same day a Naqvi-controlled entity received funds from Abraaj Investment Management.

Chinese Capital Overlaps:

Merali’s current African investment focus at Lightrock intersects with zones of heavy Chinese state activity (e.g., Kenyan railway electrification contracts with Chinese firms).

He is a personal angel investor in Nairobi-based Ilara Health, which is backed by the Chinese venture capital fund ShakaVC.

The Security Alarm:

The convergence of Merali’s ongoing Soros network ties, his past in a firm that attempted to sell vital Pakistani assets to a Chinese state entity, and his current investments alongside Chinese capital, all meeting a senior Indian opposition leader at one of India’s most sensitive border locations, has raised a storm of questions among security experts regarding the purpose, approval, and content of the discussions.

III. The German Sojourn: Meetings with Soros-Linked and Anti-India Entities

Rahul Gandhi’s visit to Germany, during an ongoing Parliament session, involved a series of behind-closed-doors meetings that have sparked major controversy. He openly met Cornelia Woll, a direct associate of George Soros at the Soros-founded Central European University.

The list of individuals and organizations he allegedly met includes:

Dr. Daniela Schwarzer: Former Executive Director for Europe and Eurasia at Open Society Foundations (OSF) (2021-2023).

Dr. Thorsten Benner of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi): His organization received continuous OSF funding from 2014-2021. GPPi has published articles critical of India’s Pulwama response and Kashmir policy. Benner also sits on the German Marshall Fund (GMF) expert panel, whose advisory council includes former CIA officials.

Dr. Manisha Reuter of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR): Her organization is funded by three entities banned by India’s Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA): Open Society Foundations, European Climate Foundation, and Children’s Investment Fund Foundation.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES): Lists OSF as an official partner. Published a 2022 report placing “cow vigilantes in Modi’s India” alongside global authoritarian regimes.

Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS): Published content framing the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) as a “Hindu Rashtra agenda.” Partners with Harsh Mander’s Centre for Equity Studies, whose FCRA license was suspended by the MHA. Harsh Mander has long been associated with the Congress and Soros-linked networks.

Progressive Alliance: Coordinated meetings through Tania Sanchez Toledo. This network lists the Indian National Congress and Samajwadi Party as members, but also includes Pakistan’s Awami Party and National Party, whose successor groups have called Kashmir an “occupation” and opposed Article 370’s revocation.

The pattern identified is consistent: meetings with organizations funded by OSF or MHA-banned entities, individuals who have published articles attacking India’s policies, and politicians maintaining channels with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

IV. The Journalist Network: US Tour and Coordinated Disinformation Campaign

A group of 7-8 Indian journalists traveled to the USA in October 2025. Upon their return, they launched a synchronized attack on the government, culminating in a false narrative that PM Modi’s name appeared in the Epstein Files – a claim later debunked.

Their US itinerary and hosts reveal a concerning pattern:

Event 1 (Washington DC, Oct 1-2): “Voices of the Republic” at the Capitol Hill, organized by the Global Gandhi Network (run by Sam Pitroda) and co-organized by The Public India. A speaker was Rasheed Ahmed of IAMC (Indian American Muslim Council), an organization charged under UAPA with alleged links to Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami.

Event 2 (Palo Alto, Oct 19): Organized by Hindus for Human Rights (HfHR) and Association for India’s Development. HfHR allegedly receives indirect Soros funding via the Tides Foundation and works with groups like IAMC and CAIR.

Event 3 (New Jersey): Meet and Greet hosted by the Indian Overseas Congress (IOC) USA, with President Mohinder Singh Gilzian and MP Vivek Tankha present.

Event 4 (Washington DC, Oct 1): Meeting at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, moderated by Dr. Muqtader Khan (X account withheld in India). New Lines Institute is headed by Dr. Ahmed Alwani, also Vice President of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), described as a Muslim Brotherhood institution. The institute integrates several alumni from Stratfor, a private intelligence firm with ex-agency staff.

The Execution: 

Journalists including Neelu Vyas Thomas, Rakesh Pathak, Anand Vardhan Singh (The Public India), and others returned and launched identical narratives across platforms like HW News, DB Live, and Satya Hindi. These were amplified in lockstep by Congress IT cell and leaders like Sanjay Raut and Srivatsa YB.

The allegation is that this was a foreign-funded, politically coordinated influence operation masterminded by a confluence of US-based entities, Soros networks, the Muslim Brotherhood, Pakistani elements, and the Congress party, executed by compromised journalists.

V. The PROTO Network & The Legal Threat

An OSINT researcher (The Hawk Eye) published a detailed thread alleging a media-narrative control network centered on Kota Neelima, wife of Congress spokesperson Pawan Khera.

The Alleged Structure:

PROTO: Founded in 2018 by the International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), alleged to be a conduit for foreign funds to journalists globally. ICFJ receives funding from OSF and USAID.

Funding Chain: ICFJ and GFMD are funded by entities like the Knight Foundation, Luminate, and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) – an organization expelled by Russia and China for alleged regime-change operations.

Neelima’s Role: Allegedly built a media ecosystem (2017 onward) through the Institute of Perception Studies, Rate The Debate, Hakku Initiative, and StudioAdda, hosting 25-30 journalists critical of the government (e.g., Ashutosh, Paranjoy Guha Thakurta). This platform is claimed to influence the pre-screening of Indian journalists for foreign funding.

Islamist Links: PROTO’s founder, Nasr ul Hadi, oversees journalist selection for South Asia. His brother, Saif ul Hadi, is associated with Jamaat-e-Islami Hind and its Vision 2040, having participated in anti-CAA protests. This is presented as a “division of roles”: foreign funding for narrative building, on-ground Islamist activism, and political amplification by Congress.

Editorial Bias: ICFJ-commissioned stories in India (2020-2024) allegedly focused exclusively on themes like minority persecution and hate speech under Modi, while ignoring topics like Islamist violence or forced conversions.

In response, Kota Neelima issued a legal threat against the researcher, calling the thread a “defamatory rant” and promising civil and criminal proceedings. No detailed rebuttal has been issued by the Congress or the named organizations.

The evidence reveals a coordinated network: a Congress leader meeting Soros-linked executives at sensitive borders; clandestine talks with foundations banned by India; journalists weaponized after U.S. tours funded by Congress allies and adversarial groups.

The pattern is deliberate. The synchronization is exact. This is a machine built on foreign capital and anti-India narratives, operating for years outside power.

It’s no longer about politics, it’s about penetration. The integrity of the state demands an immediate, surgical investigation. Not to debate, but to dismantle. Sovereignty is non-negotiable.

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How The New York Times Diluted A Hindu Lynching In Bangladesh Into A ‘South Asia’ Narrative

A report published by the The New York Times on 22 December 2025, detailing the lynching of a Hindu garment worker in Bangladesh, has come under sharp criticism from commentators and readers who accuse the newspaper of ideological bias, selective context, and narrative dilution in its coverage of the crime.

The New York Times article reported the killing of Dipu Chandra Das, a 27-year-old Hindu employee at a garment factory near Dhaka, who was accused by Muslim co-workers of blasphemy following a workplace discussion. According to the report, Das was dragged into the street by colleagues, where an angry mob lynched him, tied his body to a tree, and set it on fire. Bangladeshi authorities later arrested 12 people in connection with the killing, while police said they were unable to verify any statement made by Das that could substantiate the blasphemy allegation.

While acknowledging the brutality of the incident, critics argue that the newspaper’s framing diluted the specific religious nature of the crime by placing it within what it described as a “wider pattern of religious intolerance in South Asia.”

They point out that the article juxtaposed the lynching of a Hindu in Bangladesh with references to unrelated incidents in India, including violence by “Hindu vigilantes” against Muslims, thereby shifting focus away from the crime at hand.

Observers have also recalled that, just days earlier, an Indian court had convicted 10 Muslim men for the lynching of Ram Gopal Mishra, a Hindu, a fact not referenced in the New York Times report. Critics contend that such omissions contribute to an unbalanced portrayal in which violence against Hindus in Muslim-majority contexts is relativised, while unrelated incidents elsewhere are inserted to maintain a preconceived regional narrative.

Another point of contention has been the language used to describe the perpetrators. While the article noted that Das’s co-workers accused him of blasphemy, critics argue that the report avoided identifying the attackers as part of a broader pattern of Islamist or religiously motivated violence. Instead, they were largely described as “co-workers” or members of an angry mob, despite the killing being triggered by an accusation of insulting Islam’s Prophet Muhammad – a pattern seen in multiple blasphemy-related lynchings in the region.

The New York Times article also linked the incident to political instability in Bangladesh following the fall of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the interim leadership of Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. While human rights groups cited in the report expressed concern about the safety of religious minorities, critics say the emphasis on governance challenges further softened accountability for religious extremism by framing the murder as a symptom of disorder rather than a targeted act of communal violence.

Several commentators have accused the report’s authors, Saif Hasnat, Mujib Mashal, and contributor Suhasini Raj, of employing what they describe as a familiar editorial template: contextualising violence against Hindus within a broader regional comparison that prominently features alleged Hindu extremism in India, even when the primary incident occurs outside India and involves Muslim perpetrators.

This is exactly the same template that Western media employs to cover religious violence in the region which they prefer calling South Asia rather than the Indian sub-continent; particularly allegations that crimes against Hindus in Muslim-majority countries are frequently reframed to avoid direct attribution of religious motivation, while violence involving Hindus elsewhere is foregrounded as ideological or majoritarian.

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USCIRF Targets Modi’s India As “Country Of Particular Concern” While Ignoring Violence Against Hindu Minority In Islamist Mobocracy Bangladesh Ruled By Muhammad Yunus

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has come under sharp criticism on social media over allegations of selective focus and double standards in its assessment of religious freedom violations worldwide, particularly in relation to India and Bangladesh.

Critics have pointed out that while USCIRF has repeatedly designated India as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) and highlighted individual cases to build what they describe as a specific narrative, it has not accorded the same classification to Bangladesh, despite repeated instances of violence against religious minorities there.

According to commentators, USCIRF does not classify Bangladesh even under the CPC category.

In its 2025 Annual Report, the commission acknowledged that Hindus in Bangladesh are often targeted more due to their political affiliations than purely for religious reasons.

Nevertheless, Bangladesh was not designated as a CPC, a decision that has drawn criticism in light of recent violent incidents.

In recent days, USCIRF has issued statements or comments on a range of global cases, including the trial of Umar Khalid in India, the Bondi Beach attack on Jewish individuals in Australia, the assassination of a Christian pastor in Pakistan, and the case of a Catholic prisoner in China.

Statements on Umar Khalid
On Bondi Beach Terror Attack, but nothing on the terror
On pastor assassination in Pakistan
China

Observers noted that these interventions were promptly shared on the commission’s official social media platforms.

However, critics have highlighted what they describe as a conspicuous silence from USCIRF regarding the killing of Dipu Chandra Das, who was allegedly murdered by a radical Islamist mob in Bangladesh. They noted that none of the current USCIRF commissioners had publicly commented on the incident, despite its severity and in a case where there was absolutely no proof of the blasphemy charges.

Attention has also been drawn to the composition of the commission itself. Critics allege that USCIRF’s commissioners are predominantly practising Catholics, followed by prominent Muslim members, with some Jewish representation, while Hindus, who constitute roughly 15% of the global population, have no representation on the body. This, they argue, raises questions about balance and perspective in the commission’s reporting and priorities.

The criticism has reignited a broader debate over whether USCIRF functions as an impartial watchdog on religious freedom or selectively amplifies certain narratives while overlooking others. As of now, USCIRF has not issued a response addressing the specific allegations of bias or its silence on the killing of Dipu Chandra Das in Bangladesh.

(This article is based on an X Thread By The Hawk Eye)

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