The claim that Brahmins in Tamil Nadu never faced violence from the Dravidianists has been debunked several times and with larger amounts of proof coming up each time.
If one thought this was not reported much in India, that might be true. Unlike Kashmiri Pandit massacre and the Chitpavan massacre, the continued eviction and harassment that Tamil Brahmins have been facing did not go unnoticed by the New York Times back in the 1950s.
An archival report published by The New York Times on 6 December 1957 offers a rare international snapshot of caste tensions in South India during the height of the Dravidian movement, documenting what it described as a period of intense hostility directed at the Brahmin community.
The report, datelined New Delhi, detailed a surge in anti-Brahmin mobilisation led by Dravidian ideologue EV Ramasamy Naicker (popularly known as Periyar), noting that the campaign had already resulted in 2,884 arrests as authorities attempted to contain escalating unrest.
Parliament Briefed on Anti-Brahmin Activity
According to the report, India’s then Home Minister Govind Ballabh Pant presented findings to Parliament on what was described as a flare-up of anti-Brahmin activity. The developments were portrayed as not merely political agitation but a movement blending political, social, and racial rhetoric against the community.
The newspaper characterised the campaign as one of the central political weapons of Periyar’s Dravidian movement, which positioned itself as representing the interests of “original Dravidians” of South India.
Ideological Roots of the Conflict
The report explained that Dravidian activists accused Brahmins of historical domination alleging that Brahmins had “trampled and perverted” native traditions after migrating from the north centuries earlier.
However, from the standpoint of Brahmin communities, the period marked growing social insecurity. The report recorded incidents of intimidation and violence, including assaults on individuals performing religious rituals.
Calls for Violence Draw Alarm
One of the most alarming elements highlighted by the newspaper was rhetoric attributed to Periyar during the period.
It reported that on his seventy-ninth birthday, he had asked followers for a “birthday present”, the death of Brahmins, a statement that intensified national concern over incitement and public order.
The report further noted threats by sections of the movement to burn the Constitution of India, which they alleged had been framed under Brahmin influence.
Constitution Burning and Street Violence
Government briefings cited by the newspaper stated that members of Dravidian organisations had burned copies of the Constitution on November 26.
In addition, the Home Minister reported incidents where Brahmins engaged in ritual bathing were attacked, their sacred threads cut, and their traditional hair tufts shorn, acts seen as symbolic humiliation targeting religious identity.
Legislative Response: Anti-Insult Law
In response, the Madras State Legislature enacted a law, referred to in the report as the Prevention of Insults to National Honor Act, criminalising acts such as burning the Constitution or desecrating images of Mahatma Gandhi.
The move was presented as an attempt to curb extremist protest methods and restore civic order.
Social Climate and Brahmin Position
The New York Times piece observed that the unrest had made life “unpleasant” for Brahmins in parts of South India, even as the community continued to command social respect in other regions of the country.
It contextualised Brahmins’ traditional standing within Hindu society, as priests and custodians of ritual life, while also noting their disproportionate representation in education, administration, and government in early post-Independence India.
At the time, several top constitutional offices, including President, Prime Minister, and key Union ministers, were held by Brahmins, a factor that critics cited as evidence of elite dominance, but which supporters viewed as a reflection of educational advancement.
Historical Snapshot, Continuing Debate
The archival coverage remains significant today as it documents how caste politics, social reform movements, and identity conflicts were perceived internationally during a formative period in India’s political evolution.
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Between 2015 and 2026, Sadhguru and the Isha Foundation have repeatedly found themselves at the centre of viral controversies, legal complaints and online allegations. Many of these claims gained rapid traction across social media and digital platforms before being tested through court proceedings, police inquiries or official clarifications.
In this report, we look at 15 incidents between 2015 and 2026 in which false claims, misleading content and negative narratives were circulated against Sadhguru and the Isha Foundation.
#1 YouTuber Shyam Meera Singh & Communist Mathur Sathya Peddle False Claims on Isha Video – February 2026
A fresh social media controversy erupted on 17 February 2026 after YouTuber Shyam Meera Singh alleged that the Isha Foundation had shared visuals of “half-naked minor girls.” The claim quickly went viral. The Isha Foundation rejected the charge as misinformation, stating the video showed boys aged 10–18 from its male-only Samskriti Gurukulam performing a supervised ritual dip at the men-only Suryakund. Singh later deleted his post, citing confusion due to the children’s long hair. CPI member Mathur Sathya also amplified the allegation, but despite the foundation’s clarification, his video continues to remain on his handle.
#2 Delhi HC Orders Google to Act Against Fake Arrest Ads – 21 October 2025
The Delhi High Court directed Google to implement technology-based safeguards to curb fake advertisements falsely claiming that Sadhguru had been arrested. The court noted that AI-generated and doctored ads promoting fraudulent investment schemes were circulating online using his image. Observing the potential for public deception and reputational harm, the court instructed the platform to proactively prevent such misuse. The order came amid growing concerns over deepfake-driven financial scams targeting public figures.
#3 Delhi HC Orders Removal of “Sadhguru Exposed” Video – 9 May 2025
The Delhi High Court ordered the removal of a video uploaded by YouTuber Shyam Meera Singh titled “Sadhguru EXPOSED: What’s happening in Jaggi Vasudev’s Ashram?” The Isha Foundation had filed a defamation suit alleging the video contained unverified and damaging claims. The court found the content to be prima facie defamatory and noted its clickbait character and potential to harm the organisation’s reputation. It directed takedown of the material pending further proceedings. The case highlighted judicial concern over allegedly misleading digital content targeting religious and spiritual organisations.
#4 Isha Files Defamation Suit Against Nakkheeran – 3 December 2024
The Isha Foundation moved the Delhi High Court against Tamil media outlet Nakkheeran over videos and reports alleging misconduct, exploitation and coercion at the organisation. The foundation argued the content was defamatory and continued despite earlier court observations in which individuals linked to the controversy stated they were residing at the Isha Yoga Centre voluntarily. The suit sought removal of the material and damages for reputational harm.
A video clip from a Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage involving Sadhguru was circulated online implying inappropriate conduct during an interaction with a participant. According to the Isha Foundation, the footage was selectively edited from a longer public video showing hundreds of devotees present. The foundation stated that removal of context created a misleading narrative about the event. Supporters argued that the viral clip distorted the nature of a routine spiritual process.
#6 Isha Flags Wave of Misleading Headlines – 19 October 2024
The Isha Foundation issued a public clarification addressing what it described as multiple misleading headlines and social media posts alleging wrongdoing by the organisation and Sadhguru. In an official article, the foundation stated that several claims circulating online were either unverified or entirely fabricated. It urged readers to rely on authenticated sources and warned that distorted narratives were fuelling unwarranted speculation.
#7 Supreme Court Closes Confinement Allegation Case – 3 October 2024
The Supreme Court closed proceedings in a habeas corpus case alleging that two adult women were being confined at the Isha Foundation ashram in Coimbatore. After interacting with the women, the court recorded that they were residing at the ashram voluntarily. Tamil Nadu Police also reported no evidence of illegal confinement. The case had earlier prompted a Madras High Court-ordered inquiry before being transferred. With no coercion established, the Supreme Court terminated further action, bringing judicial closure to one of the more widely circulated allegations against the foundation.
#8 Viral Email on Minor Girls Termed Fabricated – October 2024
A purported email alleging inappropriate practices involving minor girls at the Isha Yoga Center during Brahmacharya initiation triggered online controversy. Responses cited by supporters and former participants pointed out factual inaccuracies in the claims, including incorrect descriptions of rituals and facilities. Parents and former students publicly rejected the allegations. The Isha Foundation termed the email fabricated and initiated defamation proceedings.
#9 TNM & Nakkheeran Make Fake Claims On Isha Crematorium Row – June 2024
The News Minute (TNM) reported that an FIR was filed against the Isha Yoga Foundation following a complaint by Thanthai Periyar Dravida Kazhagam (TPDK) activists, who alleged they were attacked during a visit to a crematorium site at Boluvampatti. However, the visit was reportedly made without official permission, despite a court order restricting access to the construction area. The Isha Yoga Centre has maintained the electric crematorium was built following requests from nearby Scheduled Tribe villages lacking facilities. Subsequently, the Madras High Court restrained police from closing the case and sought action against TPDK members, casting doubt on the initial allegations.
#10 ‘Missing Volunteers’ Claim Against Isha Falls Flat – April 2024
Allegations about mysteriously missing volunteers at the Isha Yoga Centre were addressed after Tamil Nadu Police told the Madras High Court on 18 April 2024 that no wrongdoing by the foundation was found. During habeas corpus proceedings filed by C. Thirumalai regarding his brother C. Ganesan, police said 36 persons were questioned and most reported “missing” volunteers had returned after leaving for personal reasons. The court, noting the petitioner’s absence, warned the case could be dismissed if he failed to appear.
#11 Adiyogi Statue Permissions Confirmed – 16 August 2023
Allegations circulated online claiming the Adiyogi statue and related structures at the Isha Yoga Centre were built without required approvals. However, officials confirmed that the installations had received proper permissions from relevant authorities. Reports citing government sources stated that the constructions complied with regulatory requirements, countering claims of illegal building activity.
#12 Police Close Case on Sadhguru’s Wife’s Death – 21 February 2023
A complaint alleging Sadhguru’s involvement in the death of his wife Vijayakumari (Vijji) was investigated by Coimbatore Police. After several months of inquiry, police concluded that there was no evidence of wrongdoing and closed the case. Despite the closure, related allegations continued to circulate online.
#13 Wildlife Complaint Over Snake Display Falls Flat – 16 October 2022
The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) filed a complaint alleging improper handling of a snake at an event associated with Sadhguru and the Isha Foundation. Forest officials later clarified that the snake had been safely released and that no wildlife law violation was established. The matter remained at the level of a complaint without prosecution. Authorities indicated that available evidence did not support claims of mistreatment, effectively closing the controversy.
An RTI response from the Tamil Nadu government stated that the Isha Yoga Centre in Coimbatore had not encroached on forest land and was not located within a notified elephant corridor. The clarification came after allegations circulated online claiming wildlife and land violations. Officials confirmed that no such corridor was notified in the relevant forest division. The RTI reply effectively refuted one of the earliest major claims levelled against the foundation during the period under review.
#15 Madras HC Dismisses Plea Against Isha Samskriti School – March 2015
The Madras High Court rejected a petition by advocate M. Vetriselvan seeking to restrain Isha Samskriti from admitting young children and teaching Vedic and traditional subjects. The bench of Chief Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice M. M. Sundresh observed that India accommodates diverse education models and no individual can impose a single framework. The court viewed the plea as an attempt to constrain educational diversity and dismissed the interim request. Vetriselvan had alleged violations of Articles 14 and 21 and questioned approvals. Isha Samskriti offers a holistic curriculum combining yoga, traditional arts, Sanskrit, English and basic mathematics.
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Frontline – the national magazine published by The Hindu – has plastered its March 2026 cover with a grotesque anti-Brahmin caricature that recalls the darkest techniques of 20th-century racial propaganda.
The Hindu which has gone on to become a Leftist-Dravidianist rag peddling propaganda instead of objective news has crossed a line from partisanship into something far uglier — the visual demonization of an entire community.
Rather than grappling with the substance of the nationwide debate over the University Grants Commission’s newly proposed Equity Regulations, 2026, the magazine chose to splash its cover with a grotesque caricature of a Brahmin figure onto Edvard Munch’s famous artworkThe Scream — complete with exaggerated cultural markers — styled in a manner disturbingly reminiscent of early 20th-century racial propaganda.
The visual imagery is similar to how the Nazis portrayed Jews as ugly creatures to peddle hate against them.
The technique is depressingly familiar:
Reduce a community to exaggerated physical and cultural stereotypes.
Frame them as hysterical or morally suspect.
Present them visually as a monolithic adversary.
History has seen this before. Anti-Jewish caricatures in Nazi Germany operated through precisely this grammar of distortion — not to argue policy, but to embed contempt in the public imagination.
The Hypocrisy Is Staggering
Imagine the reaction if a national magazine caricatured a minority community using exaggerated religious symbols. The outrage would be immediate — and rightly so. Editorial boards, academic circles, and activist groups would denounce it as hate speech.
But when the target is Brahmins, a community already demonized in sections of political discourse, suddenly caricature becomes “social critique.”
Bigotry does not become virtuous simply because it is directed at a group considered socially dominant. Dehumanization remains dehumanization.
The Dangerous Normalization Of Anti-Brahmin Caricature
Anti-Brahmin imagery has long been weaponized in certain ideological traditions — portraying Brahmins as conspiratorial, parasitic, manipulative, or hysterical. These visual tropes parallel historical propaganda methods used to stigmatize Jews in Europe.
The similarity is not accidental. Caricature has always been the lazy shortcut of those unwilling to argue on merit.
By placing such imagery on its cover, Frontline did not merely comment on a regulatory debate. It reinforced a cultural narrative that treats an entire caste identity as a legitimate object of ridicule.
Similar To The Dravidianist Trope
What Frontline’s latest caricature reflects is not an isolated lapse in taste — it fits into a much wider pattern of ideological hate messaging that has been circulated in parts of Indian public discourse for decades. A detailed analysis of Dravidianist propaganda demonstrates how visual and textual tropes eerily mimic the mechanics of early 20th-century Nazi imagery, transposed onto the Tamil Brahmin community.
Tamil Brahmins have been repeatedly depicted in Dravidian literature and pop culture as physically grotesque, morally sinister, and existentially threatening — characteristics long reserved in Nazi propaganda for Jews. Common caricatureal elements include exaggerated pot bellies, scary expressions, and religious markers like the sacred tuft or dhoti being twisted into symbols of menace rather than identity.
Through what psychologists call the Picture Superiority Effect, such grotesque visuals embed prejudice far more effectively than written argument ever could. Repeated use of zoomorphic depictions — showing Brahmins as octopuses, worms, or parasitic blobs — drives home a narrative of Brahmins as both dominant and threatening, just as Nazi cartoons once did with Jews.
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Tamil Nadu Advocate General P.S. Raman has declined to give approval for initiating criminal contempt proceedings against former Madras High Court judge D. Hariparanthaman over remarks he made about Justice G.R. Swaminathan in connection with the Thirupparankundram Karthigai Deepam matter decided in December 2025.
In his written communication, Raman stated that he had reviewed the former judge’s comments and clarified that he neither agreed with nor endorsed the opinions expressed. However, he chose not to grant sanction under Section 15(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, citing the constitutional protections of free speech and the right to critique.
Explaining his decision, the Advocate General observed that the statements were made by a retired High Court judge who would be conscious of the weight of his words. Without delivering a finding on whether the remarks tarnished the institution’s image or imputed motives to a sitting judge, Raman said he was exercising his discretion to close the matter at his level.
At the same time, he clarified that the complainant — Srirangam-based temple activist Rangarajan Narasimhan — remained free to directly approach the Madras High Court under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act if he wished to pursue the issue further.
The request for sanction had been based on two Tamil-language interviews given by the retired judge and uploaded on YouTube on December 4 and 6, 2025. Transcripts submitted with the complaint included a remark in which Hariparanthaman allegedly said that Justice Swaminathan was a “Sanghi,” comparing it to his own ideological leaning as a communist. The Advocate General reviewed both the transcripts and the video recordings before issuing a detailed order.
Addressing the question of impartiality, Raman referred to an instance where the Attorney General had stepped aside from a similar matter involving former Supreme Court judge Markandey Katju due to personal acquaintance. He clarified that no such conflict arose in the present case, as his familiarity with Hariparanthaman was limited to professional interactions during his tenure as a judge and earlier as a lawyer.
Raman noted that the central issue before him was whether the interviews constituted criminal contempt. He emphasized that when individuals who have held constitutional office are accused of contempt for public criticism of the judiciary, authorities must exercise heightened caution in deciding whether to permit prosecution.
While underscoring that those who have occupied high constitutional positions ought to maintain restraint in commenting on judges or the judicial system, he also stressed that such remarks must be evaluated within the broader framework of freedom of expression and the legitimate space for criticism.
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Rabid India/Hindu-hater, casteist genocide monger and Dravidian Model propagandist R.S. Nilakantan, better known by his online alias Puram, has been sharing “data” to show how Tamil Nadu is doing well under the DMK rather than the ADMK.
A couple of charts he shared claimed Tamil Nadu’s GDSP growth rank was better under the DMK rather than the ADMK.
ADMK vs DMK on GSDP Growth Rank among large states.
I mean, you may have criticisms against the DMK. But to claim it did not generate growth or was worse in that department than the ADMK is objectively false. pic.twitter.com/EuUchwF5Up
The chart he shared showedTamil Nadu ranked 1st in GSDP growth among large states in 2024-25, topped with self-congratulatory captions about “continuous acceleration” and “Dravidian model success.” What he doesn’t tell you is that nearly every pillar of that growth story was built under ADMK rule and that DMK’s own initial track record was a disaster that they have carefully airbrushed out of the propaganda.
He shared another chart where he claimed “Tamil Nadu’s female workforce in manufacturing, famously, constituted 44% of the national female workforce in manufacturing in 2024-25. This, despite the state being 6% of India’s population”, without attrinuting it to the right party.
Tamil Nadu’s female workforce in manufacturing, famously, constituted 44% of the national female workforce in manufacturing in 2024-25. This, despite the state being 6% of India’s population.
Which industries do these women work in, and how has it changed over time? Here is how! pic.twitter.com/L6L4HzAFeu
Tamil Nadu’s emergence as India’s electronics manufacturing hub begins with a single signature in July 2005: the Nokia MoU signed under CM Jayalalithaa.
What ADMK Did
Jayalalithaa’s government offered Nokia a landmark SEZ package in Sriperumbudur: VAT reimbursement for five years, land at 50% cost, complete stamp duty exemption, and power-sector support.
The MoU was signed in July 2005, when Jayalalithaa was Chief Minister (May 2001 – May 2006).
Nokia began operations in 2006, and by 2008-2010, Sriperumbudur was the world’s largest mobile phone manufacturing facility, employing over 25,000 workers directly and indirectly.
This created the skilled labour pool, supply chain vendors, and global credibility that would later attract Apple, Samsung and Foxconn.
The Nokia boom during 2001-2006 dmk tenure was because of ADMK’s effort to bring the plant to the state creating special economic zone SEZ.
EPS during his tenure of 2017-2021 brought tata electronics, pegatron, Salcomp, iphone manufacturing facility to the state, ADMK 🌱✌️😎 pic.twitter.com/6kP2x8bzTU
DMK inherited the operational plant when Karunanidhi became CM in May 2006. Their contribution? Labour disputes, tax administration fights, and ultimately, the plant’s decline.
Nokia workers protested in 2009-2010 under the DMK government, alleging suppression of unionisation rights and tax refund corruption.
Nokia shut down Sriperumbudur operations in 2014 (under ADMK’s watch during Microsoft’s acquisition), but the foundational electronics ecosystem – skilled workers, vendor base, logistics infrastructure remained and was inherited once again by DMK in 2021.
Bottom line: The electronics manufacturing base that today produces iPhones and employs 44% of India’s female factory workforce was seeded by Jayalalithaa’s Nokia gambit in 2005, not by DMK’s propaganda videos.
Apple And Foxconn: ADMK Brought Them In
DMK loves to take credit for Tamil Nadu becoming India’s “iPhone manufacturing capital.” The reality: Foxconn entered Tamil Nadu in 2017, four years before DMK came to power.
Timeline
2017 (Under ADMK CM Edappadi K. Palaniswami): Foxconn began assembling iPhones at the former Nokia plant in Sriperumbudur.
2016-2021 (ADMK Rule): Tamil Nadu established a dedicated Taiwan Desk under Guidance TN to attract Taiwanese electronics manufacturers. Foxconn’s initial investments and workforce training happened under this framework.
2021 onwards (DMK Rule): Foxconn’s expansion accelerated but this was driven by three factors that had nothing to do with DMK:
Central Government’s PLI (Production-Linked Incentive) schemes launched in 2020-21 under PM Modi, offering ₹41,000 crore for electronics manufacturing.
Apple’s global China+1 supply chain diversification post-COVID, which benefited India universally.
The workforce and vendor ecosystem left behind by Nokia and seeded by ADMK’s 2017 Foxconn entry.
The Foxconn Supercycle Is ADMK’s Legacy
The female workforce chart shows a dramatic surge in electronics manufacturing employment post-2021. DMK points to this and says “see, we did it.”
Here’s what the data actually shows:
The foundation was Nokia (ADMK, 2005) and the vendor base it created.
The entry point was Foxconn’s 2017 pilot plant under ADMK.
The policy tailwind was the 2020 Central PLI scheme (Modi government, not state government).
The scale-up investment (₹15,000 crore committed by Foxconn in 2025) came after DMK’s 2023 Global Investors Meet, yes – but would never have happened without the 2005-2021 ADMK groundwork.
If ADMK had remained in power post-2021, the same PLI benefits, the same Apple diversification and the same Foxconn investment would have landed in Tamil Nadu. The difference: ADMK would not have wasted a year crashing to 11th rank in GSDP growth in 2022-23 before riding the rebound.
The EV Revolution: ADMK’s 2019-2020 Policy Framework
Tamil Nadu’s emergence as India’s EV hub – home to Ola Electric’s world’s largest two-wheeler factory and Ather Energy’s base, is routinely credited to DMK’s “forward-looking industrial policy.”
The actual policy that created this boom was notified under ADMK CM Edappadi K. Palaniswami in 2019-2020.
What The EV Policy Did (Under ADMK)
Tamil Nadu’s Electric Vehicles Policy 2019, released under EPS, offered:
100% electricity tax exemption for EV manufacturers for five years.
25% capital subsidy on investments up to ₹50 crore.
Dedicated EV manufacturing zones with single-window clearance.
This policy is what attracted:
Ola Electric (Krishnagiri mega-factory, operational from 2021 onwards)
Ather Energy (Hosur facility expansion)
Hyundai Motor India’s EV plans (Chennai hub)
TVS Electric’s scale-up (Tamil Nadu base)
All of these investments were seeded between 2019 and 2021 under ADMK rule, aligned with the Central Government’s FAME-II scheme and Modi’s 2020 PLI for Advanced Chemistry Cell (battery) manufacturing.
What DMK Inherited
DMK took office in May 2021, just as these EV projects were moving from MoU stage to ground-breaking. They have presided over the execution phase, which is operationally important, yes but the policy design, the investment attraction, and the initial commitments were ADMK’s work.
The female workforce chart (as shared above by Puram) labels the EV sector’s rise starting post-2021. The timing is correct. The credit to DMK is not. The groundwork was laid in 2019-2020 under EPS, when DMK was in opposition and offering exactly zero EV policy vision.
The GSDP Growth Chart: What DMK Doesn’t Show You
Let’s dissect the propaganda chart DMK IT Wing has been circulating.
The chart Shows:
Tamil Nadu’s GSDP growth rate in 2024-25: 9.69% (later revised to 11.19%, the first double-digit growth in 14 years).
Rank among large states: 1st.
Visual narrative: smooth upward acceleration from DMK’s tenure.
What the Chart Hides:
DMK’s disastrous first year. In 2022-23 (Year 2 of DMK rule), Tamil Nadu’s GSDP growth rank crashed to 11th among large states – the worst performance in over a decade. The revised figure shows Tamil Nadu’s growth that year was just 6.17%, far below the national average.
The “smooth acceleration” story is a lie. What actually happened:
2021-22 (DMK Year 1): Inherited post-COVID rebound, ranked 4th (decent but not exceptional).
2022-23 (DMK Year 2): Collapsed to 11th rank, growth slowed to 6.17%.
2023-24 (DMK Year 3): Rebounded to 4th rank as national economy recovered.
2024-25 (DMK Year 4): Hit 1st rank with 11.19% growth, driven by Foxconn/Apple supercycle (ADMK legacy), EV boom (ADMK policy), and Central PLI tailwinds (Modi government).
This is not “continuous acceleration.” This is crash → rebound, with the rebound powered by investments seeded in the 2017-2021 ADMK period.
The Broader ADMK Economic Legacy: 2011-2021
The DMK chart focuses on the 2024-25 endpoint. Let’s zoom out and look at Tamil Nadu’s growth trajectory across ADMK’s decade in power (2011-2021).
ADMK’s Track Record
This shows that ADMK, while not consistently ranking 1st, kept Tamil Nadu above or near the national average even while navigating three massive external shocks:
Demonetisation (November 2016) – hit cash-intensive Tamil Nadu economy hard, especially MSMEs and construction.
GST rollout (July 2017) – disrupted state manufacturing and logistics for 12-18 months.
COVID-19 (2020-2021) – shut down factories, tourism, and exports.
Foxconn entry and pilot-scale iPhone assembly (2017).
EV Policy (2019-2020), the single most important industrial policy document of the decade.
Infrastructure: Chennai Metro Phase I completion, SIPCOT expansions, Chennai Port connectivity upgrades.
What DMK Inherited In May 2021
When DMK took power, Tamil Nadu had:
A ready-to-scale Foxconn plant awaiting PLI approval.
A notified EV policy with Ola, Ather, and Hyundai already committed.
A trained electronics manufacturing workforce from the Nokia-Foxconn lineage.
A post-COVID global supply chain pivot favouring India (Apple’s China+1).
All DMK had to do was not mess it up. Instead, they crashed Tamil Nadu to 11th rank in their second year, then rode the inevitable rebound and claimed it as their own achievement
TN’s growth usually stayed ahead of India’s. During MKS’s tenure, it slipped below twice. EPS/ADMK faced Demonetisation, GST & Covid. MKS later benefited from 2019–21 policy & investment momentum (EV, electronics supply chain ect), rebound economy & Centre’s 2020 PLI tailwinds… https://t.co/oSrgnuqAwQpic.twitter.com/DvqUCFNuVR
The 44% is the cumulative result of 34 years of Tamil Nadu industrial policy, with the Nokia (2005) and Foxconn (2017) milestones being the two inflection points – both under ADMK.
DMK claiming this as their achievement is like a relay runner taking credit for the entire race because they happened to be holding the baton when the team crossed the finish line.
Had EPS continued as CM post-2021, Tamil Nadu would have hit the same growth benchmarks, likely without the Year 2 crash, powered by the same Foxconn supercycle, the same EV boom, and the same PLI tailwinds. The only difference: the propaganda would have been less slick, because ADMK doesn’t have a ₹50 crore IT Wing budget.
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Data from Google’s Ads Transparency Center and Meta’s Ad Library reveals a systematic, crore-scale operation running out of Chennai and mainstream media isn’t talking about it.
With Tamil Nadu Assembly elections widely expected to be announced in March 2026, a quietly incorporated Chennai company is spending crores of rupees on digital advertising at a scale that dwarfs every other political entity in India except the Central government and BJP, and its ownership trail leads straight to the Chief Minister’s family.
Populus Empowerment Network Private Limited (PEN), incorporated in November 2022, has emerged as India’s most aggressive state-level political digital advertiser, according to data drawn from Google’s Ads Transparency Center and Meta’s Ad Library. Its spending is verifiable; its ads are public and its links to the ruling DMK and Chief Minister M.K. Stalin’s son-in-law V. Sabareesan are documented.
Tamil Nadu: India’s Biggest State-Level Political Ad Spender
Start with the numbers at the state level. In a three-month window, Tamil Nadu spent ₹15.1 crore on Google ads – the highest of any state in India, according to Google’s political ad transparency data.
Image Source: Economic Times
Tamil Nadu, a state with 6% of India’s population, is the spending state for political Google ads than Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state with a population nearly three times its size. This is not a marginal gap. Tamil Nadu spends 53% more than UP, and nearly 65% more than Maharashtra.
The reason becomes clear when you look at who is doing the spending.
Who Is PEN?
Populus Empowerment Network Private Limited is a Chennai-based political communications company incorporated in 2022. Its official directors are Manikandan Vasudevan and Prabhakaran Sekar, but V Sabareesan, son-in-law of Chief Minister MK Stalin, is said to exercise indirect control over the company.
PEN functions as DMK’s in-house digital and social media agency. It runs the Facebook page “Ellorum Nammudan” (596,000 followers), the Instagram handle “dmk_ellorumnammudan” (113,000 followers), and multiple other DMK-linked digital properties. It was also responsible for developing the “Makkalin Mudhalvar” app and game promoting the DMK’s “Dravidian Model” branding.
In 2024, then Tamil Nadu BJP president K Annamalai publicly accused DMK of spending ₹7.39 crore in social media ads through PEN, calling it “crony capitalism” and alleging that the Chief Minister’s family was directly profiting from state-funded political propaganda. The allegations, backed by public Meta Ad Library and Google Transparency Center data, triggered an Election Commission complaint but no regulatory action followed.
The Scale Of Spending: Crores On Google, Crores On Meta
PEN’s cumulative ad spend, as captured from publicly available transparency data, is staggering for a company that files returns as a small private limited firm:
Google Ads (2024 alone): ₹9.25 crore, placing PEN as India’s second-largest non-government political Google advertiser, ahead of Prashant Kishor’s I-PAC and most national party state units.
Meta (Facebook + Instagram), Jan–Oct 2025: ₹4.1 crore across 1,054 ads, primarily through the Ellorum Nammudan pages.
Google Ads, Jan–Oct 2025: ₹1.24 crore across 229 ads, with a sharp acceleration from July 2025 onwards.
Combined estimate (Google + Meta, full 2025 cycle): Discussions in digital monitoring communities put the total at approximately ₹14–17 crore, with February 2026 showing a fresh surge tied to the election campaign period.
To put this in perspective: CNBC TV18 reported that DMK’s total Google ad spend since 2018 is approximately ₹25 crore, placing it third nationally after the Central government’s advertising bureau and BJP.
Image Source: CNBC TV18
The February 2026 Surge: Election Machine in Full Gear
As election season accelerates, so has PEN’s spending. Data from Google’s Ads Transparency Center for the February 2026 period shows a concentrated burst of ad expenditure.
Overall, they spend approximately ₹3.6 crores for the month of February 2026 (until 26 February 2026)
Source: Google Ad Centre
10–19 February 2026 (10 days): ₹3.41 crore on a single campaign reaching crores of viewers.
13–19 February 2026 (6 days): Ads worth about ₹2 crores were displayed
11–19 February 2026 (9 days): 144 ads were shown in this period with a spend of over ₹2.6 crores
The ads shown in the above time periods are as below:
When Senthil Balaji Factor Was Used For Crisis Management Through Ad Spend
One of the most revealing patterns in PEN’s spending data is its direct correlation with negative news cycles for the DMK government.
The sharpest spending acceleration occurred in July–October 2025, when Tamil Nadu faced three consecutive political crises: the sanitation workers’ protests over caste-based discrimination, the Karur stampede tragedy on 27 September 2025 (in which 41 people died at a TVK rally, triggering political fallout for DMK ally Senthil Balaji), and the subsequent SIT inquiry.
During this period, a disproportionate share of PEN’s ad budget went towards clips of Senthil Balaji’s press conferences, attempting to shape the narrative around a minister who had become a political liability. Between October 22–24, 2025 alone, PEN poured ₹1.25–1.5 lakh per day into a single campaign pushing Balaji-related content, reaching an estimated 2–2.25 million viewers in that window.
Ads were shown just about former DMK minister Senthil Balaji who has come to be identified as ₹10 Balaji because of the allegations of scam in TASMAC popularized by Vijay during the Karur Stampede Tragedy.
The pattern confirms what critics have long alleged: PEN functions not just as a campaign ad agency but as a real-time crisis management operation funded through undisclosed channels and directed at protecting DMK’s political position between elections.
A Company Built for One Purpose
What makes PEN structurally unique, and concerning from an electoral transparency standpoint, is its exclusivity.
Unlike conventional digital agencies that serve multiple clients across sectors, PEN has no documented commercial clients outside DMK and its allied campaigns. Every trackable ad it has published promotes DMK content, attacks DMK’s political rivals (including TVK/Vijay), or promotes the “Dravidian Model” government narrative.
This raises a fundamental question that no regulatory body has publicly answered: is PEN a private commercial company or is it an undisclosed arm of the ruling party’s political machinery? If the latter, its spending running into tens of crores should arguably be disclosed under election expenditure rules, not buried in the filings of a small Chennai private limited company linked to the Chief Minister’s family.
What The Mainstream Media Has Not Asked
The data underpinning this report is entirely public. Google publishes its political ad transparency data here. Meta’s Ad Library is accessible here. PEN’s company registration is available on the Ministry of Corporate Affairs portal. Its ads are visible to anyone who looks.
And yet, as of 27 February 2026, weeks before the Tamil Nadu elections are expected to be called, not one mainstream Tamil or English news outlet has published a comprehensive account of PEN’s ad spending, its ownership structure, or its policy violation rate on Google.
The Election Commission of India, which monitors campaign expenditure, has received at least one formal complaint about PEN’s operations (from Annamalai in 2024) but has not publicly acted on it.
With the election schedule expected to be announced in the first or second week of March 2026, the window for regulatory scrutiny is narrowing. Once the Model Code of Conduct kicks in, the question will no longer be whether PEN’s spending was transparent, but whether anyone with the authority to act was paying attention when it mattered.
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India is preparing for a nationwide human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination campaign aimed at reducing cervical cancer, one of the leading causes of cancer deaths among women in the country. As the rollout approaches, public discussion has again surfaced around vaccine safety, past controversies, and the role of global health actors including concerns linked to Bill Gates–funded programmes.
A review of available scientific literature, regulatory findings, and fact-checks shows broad global confidence in HPV vaccine safety, while also highlighting why some public scepticism continues to persist.
Why the Vaccine Is Being Prioritised
Cervical cancer remains a major public health burden in India. According to health data cited in multiple reports, tens of thousands of new cases and over 40,000 deaths are recorded annually.
Persistent infection with high-risk HPV strains, particularly types 16 and 18, accounts for the majority of cervical cancer cases.
Public health experts say vaccination before exposure to the virus significantly reduces future cancer risk, which is why most national programmes target adolescent girls.
What Long-Term Safety Studies Say
Large international studies over more than a decade have generally found HPV vaccines to have a strong safety profile.
A registry-based cohort study in Sweden and Denmark involving nearly one million girls did not find evidence linking the quadrivalent HPV vaccine to autoimmune, neurological, or venous thromboembolism conditions.
Reviews of long-term safety data have reported that serious vaccine-related adverse events are rare and broadly comparable to other widely used vaccines.
The most commonly reported side effects remain mild injection-site reactions such as pain, swelling, and redness.
The World Health Organization’s Global Advisory Committee on Vaccine Safety has repeatedly reviewed global data and has stated that HPV vaccines continue to be considered extremely safe, noting that anaphylaxis occurs at roughly 1.7 cases per million doses – a very low rate.
Global usage has been extensive, with hundreds of millions of doses administered worldwide since the mid-2000s.
The 2009 India Controversy Explained
Much of the continuing public concern in India traces back to a 2009 HPV demonstration project supported by PATH, a public health nonprofit partly funded by the Gates Foundation.
Seven deaths among vaccinated girls were reported during that period. However, subsequent reviews found:
Five deaths were due to clearly unrelated causes such as drowning, snake bite, malaria, and pesticide exposure.
The remaining two deaths were considered unlikely to be linked to the vaccine.
The Indian Council of Medical Research suspended the project at the time, and a parliamentary committee later raised concerns about procedural and ethical lapses in how the demonstration programme was conducted. Importantly, those findings focused largely on consent and trial processes rather than establishing a causal safety signal for the vaccine itself.
Health authorities note that the proposed national rollout is structurally different from that earlier demonstration exercise.
Claims About Bill Gates and Legal Cases
Social media claims have periodically alleged that Bill Gates or his foundation face legal action in India over HPV vaccination. Independent fact-checks, including by international news agencies, have found no evidence of any ongoing court case in India on this issue.
The Gates Foundation has historically funded global immunisation initiatives, including support to organisations involved in HPV programmes, which partly explains why the topic continues to attract public scrutiny.
Effectiveness and Regulatory Status
HPV vaccines have been licensed in India since 2008. International evidence suggests high effectiveness, often cited in the 90–100% range, in preventing cervical cancers caused by vaccine-covered HPV strains when administered before exposure.
India’s planned expansion is expected to follow existing regulatory approvals, WHO recommendations, and structured public-health protocols, including training of healthcare workers and informed consent procedures.
Why Some Scepticism Persists
Public health specialists say vaccine hesitancy around HPV in India stems from multiple factors:
lingering memory of the 2009 programme controversy
broader distrust of pharmaceutical companies
concerns about adolescent vaccination
misinformation amplified on social media
Experts note that addressing these concerns transparently, rather than dismissing them, will be critical for public confidence.
The Bottom Line
Available global and Indian evidence to date indicates that HPV vaccines have a strong safety and effectiveness record, and major health agencies continue to recommend their use to prevent cervical cancer.
At the same time, past procedural controversies and the involvement of international philanthropic funding have contributed to ongoing public questions in India.
As the nationwide rollout approaches, health authorities face a dual challenge: expanding protection against a preventable cancer while also maintaining public trust through clear communication, monitoring, and transparency.
A few days ago, in the backdrop of the controversies surrounding Kerala Story 2, leftist rag The News Minute came up with some ‘groundbreaking’ research into the ‘numbers’ of who was converting to which religion in Kerala – and they wanted to point out which religion was ‘gaining’ the most.
Haritha John, the reporter, said she found it hard to comb through official records, yes, it must have been hard to twist the numbers to suit the leftist narrative.
The News Minute also tried to build some buzz around the ‘report’. But it has turned out to be a damp squib.
The News Minute says they combed through Kerala’s 2024 gazette and so many records to try and show its audience, that love jihad was a myth, that conversions were a myth in Kerala – a state where Hindus are not the majority.
This report’s central claim is that Hinduism is the ‘biggest’ gainer in terms of conversion. They share this table ‘data’ from the 2024 Gazette to prove their claim is right.
Screenshot of TNM article table
The News Minute highlights figures that support its conclusion, but a broader look at the data tells a different story. Try asking them to analyse it as a whole – they most likely won’t because ‘That is not how you look at data’.
Let us look at their claims:
365 people converted to Hinduism in Kerala in 2024, making it the biggest gainer in conversions.
262 of those 365 Hindu converts were Dalits who converted to gain Scheduled Caste reservation benefits.
Only 67 Christians converted to Islam in 2024, of whom 42 were women.
In 2020, Hinduism accounted for 47% of all registered conversions (241 out of 506).
Conversion patterns have remained broadly similar over several years, with Hinduism consistently the biggest gainer.
Now let us bust these lies.
Lie No. 1: “Hinduism Is the Biggest Gainer” – Their Own Table Says The Opposite
TNM leads with the claim that Hinduism attracts more converts than any other religion in Kerala, citing 365 people converting to Hinduism in 2024. This is presented as the centrepiece of their debunking.
Now look at the same table they published:
Hindus leaving faith:
Hindu → Muslim: 276
Hindu → Christian: 234
Total OUT Of Hinduism: 510
People joining Hinduism:
Christian → Hindu: 329
Islam → Hindu: 36
Total IN To Hinduism: 365
NET RESULT FOR HINDUISM: -145
Hinduism lost 145 people net, using TNM’s own numbers. More Hindus walked out the door (510) than walked in (365).
The “biggest gainer” headline is built on gross inflow alone, while deliberately hiding the net loss. This is not a subtle oversight. This is the central deception of the entire piece – burying the headline finding that their own data actually supports: more Hindus are converting to Abrahamic faiths than the reverse.
A standard practice in any honest data journalism is to present both inflows and outflows when calculating net change. TNM chose not to do this. That choice was editorial, not accidental.
Lie No. 2: The Gazette Data Represents The Full Picture Of Conversion
TNM frames “10,000 pages of Kerala Gazette records” as the authoritative source for religious conversions in the state. But gazette notification of conversion is not mandatory for everyone – it is primarily required when a person needs to formally change their name, claim government benefits, or establish their new identity legally.
The Scheduled Caste Reservation Loophole
The most significant category where gazette notification becomes almost compulsory is when Dalit Christians convert back to Hinduism to reclaim their Scheduled Caste reservation benefits – a legal and economic incentive that has nothing to do with spiritual conviction.
TNM itself admits this: 262 of their 365 Hindu converts, that is 71.7%, were Dalits converting for SC status. So Hinduism’s “biggest gainer” status is, in the majority, a bureaucratic paperwork exercise driven by reservation law, not a wave of spiritual and ideological conversion to Hinduism.
The Undercounting Of Islam Conversions
Meanwhile, conversions to Islam for marriage purposes, the most common reason cited across TNM’s own case studies, do not require gazette notification unless the person wants a formal name change. This means:
The Islam inflow number of 343 is almost certainly a significant undercount
The Hindu inflow of 365 is artificially inflated by reservation-driven reconversions
The two numbers are not comparable. Presenting them in the same table as equivalent without this caveat is a fundamental methodological failure.
According to Kerala Gazette rules, notification is optional for religious conversion unless it involves a formal name change or benefits claim. Most conversions through marriage under personal laws (Muslim Marriage Act, Christian Marriage Act) do not trigger automatic gazette notification unless the individual seeks legal name change or SC/ST status modification.
This creates a systematic sampling bias:
Dalit Christians → Hindus: Near-universal gazette notification (driven by SC status claims)
Hindus/Christians → Muslims (via marriage): Selective gazette notification (only when name change desired)
TNM uses this administratively skewed dataset as if it represents the universe of conversions in Kerala – a methodological fraud at the foundation of the entire analysis.
Lie No. 3: Applying Asymmetric Scrutiny To Hindu, Christian And Muslim Conversion Networks
Here is where TNM’s report abandons even the pretence of balance. The article:
Devotes extensive paragraphs to documenting a Christian far-right surveillance network, CASA, complete with a named source (Kevin Peter) who openly describes monitoring marriage registration offices, collecting addresses, informing parents, using force to bring women back, and coordinating with the RSS.
Documents VHP’s “Dharma Rakshakas” – 100 ground-level workers across Kerala who visit families and intervene when Hindus convert to other religions.
Quotes the Pala Diocese priest claiming to maintain “files on women lured by Muslim men.”
All of this is used to frame the right-wing as the problem – organised coercive networks policing women’s choices.
Now ask: What investigation did TNM do into the organised networks that produced the 343 Islam flow? Zero.
There is no named Muslim community organisation.
There is no equivalent investigation into whether any Islamic body monitors marriages, facilitates conversion, or pressures converts. Not a single paragraph.
In a piece ostensibly about conversions to all three religions, the machinery behind the largest single directional flow (343 → Islam) is never examined.
By TNM’s own logic, if a Christian surveillance network justifies detailed coverage and condemnation, then the absence of any equivalent investigation into Muslim conversion networks is not neutral journalism – it is a deliberate blind spot.
And to use the framing the report itself would never dare apply:
If 329 Christians converting to Hinduism warrants investigation of a VHP conspiracy, then 276 Hindus converting to Islam should warrant an equal investigation of Islamic conversion networks.
The report does one, not the other.
The report attempts to legitimize its narrative by claiming that in 2009, Kerala High Court Justice K.T. Sankaran asked the police if an organized Love Jihad movement existed, and states: “No such finding was established.”
As published in Indian Express on 9 December 2009, Justice KT Sankaran explicitly stated on record that police reports revealed a “concerted” effort to convert girls with the “blessings of some outfits”.
From the court’s order, he observed that some 3,000 to 4,000 such incidences had taken place over a four-year period. The judge went as far as advising the government to consider enacting laws to prohibit compulsive and deceptive conversions. He noted that “some organisations are indulging in such activities” and called for a comprehensive investigation.
The Supreme Court’s Dual Position In Hadiya Case
The article mentions the Hadiya case but fails to provide complete context. What actually happened:
In 2017, the Supreme Court took a dual position:
Upheld Hadiya’s individual right to marry (Shafin Jahan)
Directed NIA to investigate whether an organised network existed to facilitate such conversions and potential radicalization
The NIA was specifically asked to investigate:
Whether this was limited to a “small pocket” or “something wider”
Whether systematic forced conversions were taking place
Links to radicalization and ISIS recruitment
The Supreme Court bench (CJI JS Khehar and Justice DY Chandrachud) stated they wanted a “whole picture” from a “neutral agency.”
TNM does the first (celebrates individual marriage) and ignores the second (the legitimacy of investigating organised networks).
That is not balance – that is selection bias built into the story architecture from the beginning.
The ISIS Recruitment Reality TNM Won’t Touch
The core allegation of “Love Jihad” and the premise of films like The Kerala Story, centers on targeted grooming, deceptive practices (such as faking identities), and subsequent radicalization.
Real-world examples from Kerala:
In 2016, 21 individuals left Kerala to join ISIS, including:
Nimisha (renamed Fathima) – Hindu woman who converted to Islam, married Bexen Vincent (who converted and renamed Isa), both left for Afghanistan to join ISIS
Sonia Sebastian (renamed Ayisha) – Christian woman who converted to Islam, married Abdul Rashid Abdullah (identified by NIA as mastermind of ISIS recruitment in Kasargod)
Merrin Jacob (renamed Mariyam) – Another Kerala woman who joined ISIS with husband
Rafaela – Third woman from Kerala who fled with ISIS recruits
NIA Findings:
Abdul Rashid was identified as the ring leader of the Kasargod ISIS module
Systematic radicalization through conversion and marriage
Use of matrimonial networks and handlers to arrange marriages
PFI connections in several cases
Handlers actively seeking “active members” as grooms
This is TNM’s response to the documented security threat – The article interviews a handful of women who converted willingly and did not join a terror outfit. It then uses these anecdotes to dismiss the entire “Love Jihad” concern.
This is a classic Strawman argument – attacking a weakened, simplified version of the opponent’s claim rather than addressing the actual documented threats.
Pointing to consensual interfaith marriages does absolutely nothing to disprove the existence of organised coercive networks or the documented cases of radicalization.
Lie No. 5: The “Voluntary Coercion” Paradox (Double Standards In Agency)
The article displays severe editorial bias in how it defines “choice” versus “coercion” depending on the religion involved.
When Hindu/Christian families intervene, it is framed as “punishment,” “torture,” “emotional blackmail,” “surveillance”, “patriarchal policing”, “denial of women’s agency” and an extensive sympathetic coverage towards the girls.
When Muslim families set conditions:
From TNM’s interview with Sneha, a Hindu woman who converted to Islam: “Afsal’s family would accept our marriage only if I converted… This was my choice.”
The Fallacy
If a religious conversion is a non-negotiable prerequisite imposed by the groom’s family to accept a marriage, it inherently operates under conditionality and duress. Framing an ultimatum from a Muslim family as empowered “choice” while framing Hindu/Christian parental intervention as “patriarchal policing” is hypocritical.
Both scenarios involve family pressure. Both involve conditions on the relationship. Yet TNM applies completely different moral frameworks depending on which religion is imposing the condition.
Lie No. 6: Using Pew Data Selectively To Dismiss What It Actually Supports
The report cites the 2021 Pew Research Center finding that 98% of Muslims marry within their own community while 95% of Christians and 99% of Hindus do the same as evidence that “Love Jihad is statistically negligible.”
This is a misreading of the Pew data on multiple levels:
The Pew Data Actually Supports Asymmetric Flow
The same Pew study found that two-thirds of Indians believe it is very important to stop inter-religious marriages with Muslims being the most opposed (80%) to their women marrying outside the faith. This creates a structural asymmetry:
Muslim men face far less internal resistance when marrying non-Muslim women
Muslim women face extreme internal resistance when marrying outside
The asymmetry in the gazette data (as observed earlier) is entirely consistent with this finding – more non-Muslim women are crossing into Islam than Muslim women are crossing out, exactly as you would predict from Pew’s community endogamy data.
Strong endogamy norms and organised community intervention are not contradictory. Precisely because 98% of Muslims marry within the community, the 2% who cross community lines become:
Highly visible
Contested
Subject to pressure from multiple directions
The gazette’s 343 conversions are drawn from that contested 2%.
Category Error: Population Statistics Vs. Individual Conduct
The Pew statistic says nothing about whether organised efforts exist to facilitate or impede specific types of interfaith marriages.
Using a population-level endogamy statistic to dismiss individual-level organised conduct is a category error, comparing macro trends to micro mechanisms as if they measure the same thing.
Lie No. 7: Macro Demographic Change Is Dismissed With Micro Data
The gazette records cover roughly 950-1,000 formal conversion declarations per year in a state of 35 million people.
TNM uses this micro-slice to imply that demographic change driven by religious conversion is not happening in Kerala. But the macro demographic data tells a completely different story.
Kerala Census Data:
Muslim population share: 26.56% (2011) → 29.14% (2021) = +2.58 percentage point rise in one decade
Hindu population share: 54.73% (2011) → 52.61% (2021) = -2.12 percentage point decline
Christian population share: 18.38% (2011) → 17.87% (2021) = -0.51 percentage point decline
Vital Statistics Data (2011-2020):
Total natural accretion (births minus deaths): 26 lakhs
Muslim contribution: 16 lakhs (62%)
Hindu contribution: 6.44 lakhs (25%)
Christian contribution: 2.88 lakhs (11%)
Of the 26-lakh population increase in Kerala over the decade, Muslims alone contributed 16 lakhs, despite being only 26-29% of the population.
Muslim share in live births increased by 8%, while Hindu share declined by 4% and Christian share by 3.3%.
This means Muslim share in live births is much higher than their total share in Kerala’s population, indicating significantly higher fertility rates.
The 2.5 Percentage Point Surge
According to demographic analysis by the Centre for Policy Studies, “For the ten years of 2011 to 2020, the natural accretion to the population of Kerala has been around 26 lakhs, of which 16 lakhs are Muslims. The share of Muslims in the population in this decade, because of natural accretion alone, would have risen by about 2.5 percentage points, which would be the highest rise in their share in the entire period of modern Census.”
The previous highest was 1981-91, when Muslim share rose by 2 percentage points.
TNM’s Sleight Of Hand
By focusing only on the 950-odd gazette declarations per year, TNM creates the false impression that it has addressed the demographic change question. It has not.
The gazette data and the census demographic data measure entirely different things:
Census: Total population shifts (driven primarily by differential fertility rates)
Conflating them or using one to dismiss the other is intellectually dishonest.
These demographic shifts are primarily driven by differential birth rates, not gazette conversions – a completely separate phenomenon that the article never engages with because it would undermine the core narrative.
Lie No. 8: “Gendered Islamophobia” – A Label That Erases Gender Data In Their Own Table
The report argues that scrutiny of Hindu/Christian women marrying Muslim men, but not the reverse, constitutes “gendered Islamophobia.”
Look at the gender data in their own table:
Screenshot of TNM article table
INTO ISLAM:
Hindu → Muslim: 154 women (55.8% of flow)
Christian → Muslim: 42 women (62.6% of flow)
Total women → Islam: 196 out of 343 (57.1%)
OUT OF ISLAM:
Islam → Hindu: 24 women (66.6% of flow)
Islam → Christian: 13 women (61.9% of flow)
Total women → out of Islam: 37 out of 57 (64.9%)
Women are the majority of both the inflow into Islam AND the outflow from Islam.
The gendered nature of religious conversion is a universal feature across all three religions in this dataset – not a uniquely anti-Muslim or Islamophobic phenomenon.
Yet the report only applies the “gendered surveillance” critique when Hindu/Christian groups are involved, not when it comes to the 57 Muslim women who converted out of Islam, presumably also navigating family and community pressure.
The Pew Data TNM Won’t Apply To Muslims
The same Pew Research data the report cites shows Muslim communities are most strongly opposed to their women marrying outside (80%) – meaning Muslim women who leave for Hinduism or Christianity are likely facing the most intense internal community resistance of all.
TNM investigates this zero times. There is no coverage of:
What pressure do Muslim women converting out face?
Are there organised Muslim community efforts to prevent women from leaving Islam?
What role do Muslim religious bodies play in policing women’s choices?
The “gendered Islamophobia” framing is selectively applied to deflect scrutiny of Muslim community practices while amplifying scrutiny of Hindu/Christian community practices.
Lie No. 9: One-Sided Victimhood Narratives
TNM presents three case studies, Angel, Sneha, and Anakha, all of whom are women who chose to be in interfaith relationships with Muslim men and were subjected to coercion by Hindu/Christian family members or right-wing groups.
These stories may be entirely true and deserve to be told.
But in a piece claiming to present “the real Kerala story,” TNM presents:
Zero cases from women who allege they were manipulated, deceived or pressured into conversion-linked marriages
This is not because such cases do not exist. Courts across Kerala have heard them, including:
The Hadiya case (went to Supreme Court)
The Akhila Ashokan case (High Court annulled marriage citing “Love Jihad” concerns before SC intervention)
Multiple cases where families alleged identity fraud or grooming
The article also interviews men who converted to Islam and Christianity:
Praveen (converted to Islam): “There were some objections from relatives, but nothing beyond that.”
Suresh (converted to Islam): “I found the truth in Islam. I faced no opposition.”
TNM uses these to establish that:
Men face little interference → proving the scrutiny is gendered
Women who convert freely exist → proving “Love Jihad” is a myth
This is classic selection bias:
Interview women who confirm your narrative (willing converts facing family opposition)
Interview men who confirm your narrative (no opposition faced)
Ignore women who would contradict your narrative (those claiming deception or pressure)
Gazette conversions in 2024: ~963 total declarations
This represents 0.0027% of the population.
Using this microscopic, heavily caveated dataset to draw sweeping conclusions about religious demography in Kerala is statistically trivial.
It serves as a sleight of hand to mask:
Broader demographic realities (Muslim population rising by 2.5 percentage points)
Differential fertility rates (Muslims contributing 62% of population growth despite being 27% of population)
Aggressive, undocumented proselytization efforts
Informal conversions not requiring gazette notification
By isolating a tiny, legally mandated subset of data where Hinduism artificially appears dominant (due to SC reservation technicalities), TNM creates a narrative wholly disconnected from the macro demographic reality of Kerala.
In attempting to debunk The Kerala Story, TNM has written its own version of motivated journalism – one where the conclusion is decided first and the data is arranged around it afterwards. TNM chose to see only what it wants to perceive as reality and what it wants its readers to perceive too – the propaganda that its paymasters have hired them for.
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For years, a coordinated narrative campaign has tried to cast Auroville — a township created by international goodwill and enshrined in Indian law — as something it was never meant to be: an eco-village retirement hub for foreigners, a political trophy for ideological factions, or a battleground in India’s culture wars.
Those narratives reached a climax with the recent Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey verdict on 17 March 2025, when the Supreme Court of India unequivocally rejected claims of mismanagement, environmental destruction, and political interference — describing a pattern of litigation by a tiny minority as “ill-motivated” obstruction of legally approved development.
Yet, even after the highest court in the land delivered clarity, the campaign against Auroville’s development continues — driven by a peculiar alliance of critics on both the left and the right, using contradictory rhetoric to achieve the same end: freeze Auroville in time.
1. Targeted Campaign Against Jayanti Ravi: A Smokescreen for Ideological Battles
At the centre of the latest controversy is an orchestrated attack on Jayanti Ravi, Secretary of the Auroville Foundation. Social media threads and political commentators from vastly different ideological corners have seized on her role, not for any lawful misconduct, but as a punching bag in a broader political culture war.
Figures from the left accuse her of pushing a “Hindutva agenda.” Right-leaning commentators decry her as an outsider. Neither faction grapples with the real legal question: she is executing her statutory duties under an Act of Parliament — a fact affirmed repeatedly by the Supreme Court.
The attacks are less about governance and more about vendettas: when you have no arguments left on law or facts, you attack the person.
2. Foreign Squatters On Indian Land
Auroville’s residents – Indian and foreign – live under Indian laws and visa regulations. Residency is governed by the Auroville Foundation Act, 1988 a legislation passed by the Indian Parliament – not by social media sentiment.
Foreign nationals in Auroville hold legal visas and residency status; those who violate norms can and have had visas cancelled. This is due process, not an arbitrary crackdown.
Auroville was never intended as an enclave insulated from Indian sovereignty — it is, by statute, under central governance and subject to Indian law. Suggesting otherwise undermines India’s constitutional framework and feeds xenophobic narratives that have no basis in legal reality.
3. Lost Every Court Case — Right Up To The Supreme Court
Opposition voices have trafficked in claims ranging from land scams and environmental catastrophe to ideological capture. But the judicial record tells a singular story:
The Madras High Court reaffirmed the Foundation’s legal authority.
The National Green Tribunal’s restrictions were struck down.
The Supreme Court dismissed multiple petitions and criticized the strategy of serial litigation.
In other words: those accusing the Auroville administration of illegality lost every single legal battle, up to the Supreme Court of India.
When legal arguments fail at every judicial level, what remains is narrative warfare — and that is precisely what we are witnessing.
4. Auroville Was Never A Retirement Eco-Village
Some still cling to the outdated idea of Auroville as a quaint, foreign-centric eco-village. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Auroville’s founding documents — the Galaxy Plan and subsequent Master Plans approved in 2001 and gazetted in 2010 — were conceived as a structured, sustainable township for 50,000 residents rooted in human unity.
It was never intended to be a retirement community for wealthy foreigners who choose to settle in India indefinitely. It was never intended to sideline Indian identity, culture or law. And it was certainly never meant to be stuck in litigation forever.
5. Environmental Restoration, Not Destruction
A core claim from detractors has been that development equals ecological destruction. This, too, collapses under scrutiny:
The land in question was not legally classified as forest under the Forest (Conservation) Act.
Any tree clearance was matched with compensatory afforestation.
Water-body and infrastructure works are part of a long-approved plan meant to enhance ecological resilience, not erode it.
Technical consultation from Indian institutions has informed environmental strategy.
Planning and implementing the envisioned plan is not plunder.
7. What’s Really At Stake?
The real tragedy is not ecological impact, nor foreign residency, nor political appointment — it’s a battle of narratives. A small activist faction — amplified by news outlets and social media influencers — continues to manufacture conflict where there is none. The usual suspects of the left have their own agenda and see Jayanti Ravi as Modi’s person. A section of the right has targeted because they’re suddenly upset with Modi.
But Auroville is not a political battleground to settle scores. It’s a peaceful haven for seekers who follow the vision of The Mother. A legal framework exists.
Auroville’s future should not be held hostage to social media campaigns, partisan activists, or contradictory political narratives opposed to development.
The Mother’s vision was never meant to be a retirement retreat or a media spectacle. It was meant to be built.
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Harvard University’s Department of South Asian Studies has formally apologised for an image used to promote its Sanskrit programme, following a wave of criticism from Hindu community organisations and social media users who stated that the artwork was demeaning to Hinduism and its sacred language.
The issue gained traction when the Coalition of Hindus of North America (CoHNA) took to X accusing Harvard of “blatant Hinduphobia” over the visual, which it described as resembling “a scene straight out of a horror movie”, depicting a dark figure bearing a tilak on his forehead and holding what the coalition characterised as ghostly figurines. The image had been used on the department’s website to represent its Elementary Sanskrit course.
Blatant Hinduphobia and bigotry on display at @Harvard’s South Asian studies department.
A scene that feels straight out of a horror movie, starring a dark Hindu figure (notice the Tilak on his forehead) dangling some sort of ghostly figurines in his hands.
— CoHNA (Coalition of Hindus of North America) (@CoHNAOfficial) February 27, 2026
Responding to the backlash, the department said in a statement on Friday that it “deeply regrets the posting of an insensitive image in relation to our Sanskrit program.” It emphasised its long-standing academic engagement with the language, stating that it remained committed to teaching Sanskrit and the intellectual and cultural traditions associated with it.
The department also said it was reviewing its internal social media processes to ensure future posts better reflect its mission and values. It further clarified that the social media post in question had no connection with the Lakshmi Mittal and Family South Asia Institute, describing it as a separate and distinct entity within Harvard.
For those of you who had reached out to us, here is the official apology from the Department of South Asian Studies at @Harvard.
This is one of the rare moments where a university department has formally apologized for their Hinduphobic insensitivity! 👏🏽👏🏽
— CoHNA (Coalition of Hindus of North America) (@CoHNAOfficial) February 28, 2026
CoHNA welcomed the apology, calling it a rare instance of a university department formally acknowledging concerns raised by members of the Hindu community. The organisation said it was encouraged by what it described as the department’s recognition of the sensitivity surrounding the issue.
Great news to share! After worldwide community outrage, @Harvard has removed the image from their website! Thank you to all those who took action and expressed your concerns. 👏🏽👏🏽🙏🏽🙏🏽 https://t.co/O7iOpzsdRupic.twitter.com/jkeTxJa8aw
— CoHNA (Coalition of Hindus of North America) (@CoHNAOfficial) February 27, 2026
As the online debate unfolded, some netizens offered additional context about the artwork. According to comments circulating on social media, the image was reportedly created by Indian artist Anirudh Sainath under the brand Molee Art and titled Master of Puppets. The work was said to depict themes from the Mahabharata, though Harvard has not publicly elaborated on the artwork’s provenance in its statement.
Separately, another visual referenced in the broader online discussion, titled Millstone of the Caste System, was identified as a satirical lithograph by early 20th-century Indian artist Gaganendranath Tagore, historically understood as a critique of social hierarchy.
Harvard’s website describes Classical Sanskrit as a “transcultural, transregional language par excellence” of South Asian civilisations and highlights its importance to the study of classical literature, philosophy and intellectual history. The department offers elementary, intermediate and advanced Sanskrit courses covering major texts including the Mahabharata and the Ramayana.
