Congress scion Rahul Gandhi, recently sparked controversy by echoing Western sentiments and promoting narratives aligned with Pakistan’s viewpoint. During his speech at the launch of his party’s Sangathan Srijan Abhiyan in Bhopal, he made claims regarding Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s dealings with the United States. He suggested that Modi had bowed to pressure from former U.S. President Donald Trump, saying, “Trump made one gesture from there (the U.S.), picked up the phone and said, ‘Modiji, what are you doing? Narendra, surrender.’ And Modiji said, ‘Yes, sir,’ and followed Trump’s instructions.”
However, this assertion was far from the truth. In reality, India’s military might had already incapacitated Pakistan’s military plans before they could even execute their own strike. Pakistan’s Defence Minister himself acknowledged this, stating, “Our armed forces were prepared to act at 4:30 in the morning after Fajr prayers to teach a lesson. But before that hour even arrived, India launched a missile attack using BrahMos.” Despite this clear evidence, Rahul Gandhi opted to ignore the national interest and instead pushed a foreign agenda.
The larger truth is that Congress, particularly the Gandhi family, has a long history of “surrenders,” many of which they conveniently fail to recognize. The following events highlight key moments of surrender in India’s history, involving Rahul Gandhi’s ancestors.
1948: How India Lost A Large Part Of Kashmir To Pakistan Under Nehru
By mid-1947, Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir had already made up his mind to accede his state to India. He was simply waiting for the opportune moment to secure the best terms for the accession. However, the events that follow was completely different.
When the Maharaja offered Kashmir’s accession to India unconditionally, Jawaharlal Nehru refused the offer. Nehru insisted that Sheikh Abdullah, who had been imprisoned by the Maharaja, be released and made the Prime Minister of Kashmir before the region could merge with India. This was a non-negotiable condition for the Maharaja, and understandably so. While one could argue that the political climate at the time was challenging, it’s difficult to comprehend why Nehru would turn down such an offer unless there was an underlying political agenda. Some speculate that Lord Mountbatten may have influenced Nehru’s decision, pushing for an unusual demand that seemed to prolong the crisis unnecessarily.
October 1947: Pakistan’s Invasion and the Delay in Action
By October 1947, Pakistani raiders had invaded Kashmir and by the 22nd of the month, they were already nearing the gates of Srinagar. Maharaja Hari Singh, realizing the gravity of the situation, urgently requested military assistance from India. At this critical juncture, Sardar Patel, a key leader, proposed sending the Indian army to defend the region. However, it was Lord Mountbatten—who, despite India’s newfound independence, still held significant sway over decisions—who insisted that the Maharaja first sign the Instrument of Accession.
The delay in sending immediate military aid to Kashmir is hard to overlook when examined in hindsight. Mountbatten’s reluctance to act swiftly seemed to suggest a hidden agenda, one that favored Pakistan’s control over the region. The sequence of events that unfolded is telling:
- October 24: Srinagar goes into blackout as Pakistani forces advance.
- October 25: Instead of sending military help, Mountbatten sends a defense delegation to assess the situation.
- October 26: The delegation reports that Srinagar will be lost if action is not taken immediately. Yet, Mountbatten still insists on signing the Instrument of Accession before any military intervention.
Finally, on 27 October, the Instrument of Accession was signed by the Maharaja, and it was formally accepted by Mountbatten, making Kashmir legally a part of India. However, the fact remains that even after this, Mountbatten delayed deploying the Indian Army, while Nehru—despite being the Prime Minister—was not decisive enough to take action.
Sardar Patel’s Intervention
Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, who was present during the critical meetings regarding Kashmir’s defense, recalled how Nehru stalled the decision-making process, “As usual, Nehru talked about the United Nations, Russia, Africa, and God almighty, everybody, until Sardar Patel lost his temper. He said, ‘Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir, or do you want to give it away?’ Nehru replied, ‘Of course, I want Kashmir.’ Then Sardar Patel said, ‘Please give your orders.’ And before Nehru could respond, Patel turned to me and said, ‘You have got your orders.’”
The Ceasefire and Its Aftermath
Despite the Indian Army’s strong position and success in repelling the Pakistani forces, Nehru eventually ordered a ceasefire in 1949, which prevented India from fully reclaiming the region. Thanks to Sardar Patel’s resolve, India retained control over two-thirds of Kashmir. Had Patel been the Prime Minister, it’s likely that the entire region would have been integrated into India, and the tragic displacement of Kashmiri Pandits may have been avoided.
In the end, the reluctance and delay in decisive action—especially by Nehru—led to India’s inability to fully secure Kashmir. The consequences of these decisions still echo today, and the region remains a source of contention. If Sardar Patel had been in charge, history may have taken a very different course.
1950: Nehru Indifference On US Proposal To Replace China With India For UNSC Seat
According to a widely cited report by The Hindu (10 January 2004), former United Nations Under-Secretary-General Shashi Tharoor revealed that Nehru declined an offer from the United States in 1953 to take over China’s seat in the Security Council. Tharoor documented this in his biography “Nehru: The Invention of India“, stating that Nehru instead suggested the seat be given to the People’s Republic of China, despite its recent Communist takeover. The report stated, “Jawaharlal Nehru declined the United States offer to India to take the permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council around 1953 and suggested that it be given to China.”
Further corroboration comes from letters written by Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Nehru’s sister and India’s Ambassador to the United States at the time. During a 1950 meeting with U.S. adviser John Foster Dulles, Pandit was reportedly offered a proposal to have India replace China in the Security Council. Pandit’s correspondence with Nehru relays that he declined, explaining, “India, because of many factors, is certainly entitled to a permanent seat in the Security Council, but we are not going in at the cost of China.”
Nehru believed that such a move would provoke Beijing and compromise India’s stance on Asian solidarity. Ironically, twelve years later, China invaded India in 1962.
1955: Soviet Offer To Expand UNSC And Include India
In 1955, a second documented offer was made by the Soviet Union. This time, the proposal was not to replace any country but to expand the UNSC and include India as the sixth permanent member. Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin made the offer directly to Nehru.
Nehru once again declined, citing similar reasons. His statement at the time was, “We are opposed to pushing ourselves forward to occupy certain positions because that may itself create difficulties… This should not be done till the question of China’s admission and possibly of others is first solved.”
This position was consistent with what scholars refer to as “Nehruvian foreign policy,” which prioritized the idealistic unity of developing nations and respect for multilateral norms over strategic self-interest.
A detailed analysis of this offer is provided by the Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project, titled “Not at the Cost of China: India and the United Nations Security Council, 1950”. The article confirms that Nehru’s primary objection was based on the principle—that the People’s Republic of China should first be admitted to the UN in place of the Chinese Nationalists (Taiwan), and only after resolving that issue should India be considered.
1962: Nehru Losing Aksai Chin To China
The 1962 Indo-China War is a significant chapter in India’s military history, marked by India’s unexpected defeat at the hands of China. The war, which took place from October to November 1962, exposed critical weaknesses in India’s military preparedness, leadership, and strategic planning, leading to a loss of territory and confidence. The defeat was a direct result of a series of decisions made by Jawaharlal Nehru and his government, who, despite having been warned by intelligence agencies and military officials, remained unaware and unprepared for the scale of the Chinese threat. Here’s a detailed look at why India lost the war and how Nehru’s ignorance played a key role in the defeat:
Overconfidence in Non-Violence and a Weak Military Preparedness
Nehru, a champion of non-alignment and peaceful diplomacy, often underestimated the importance of military preparedness. His belief in peaceful coexistence and the post-independence idealism around international diplomacy led him to overlook India’s growing defense needs. After the partition of 1947, India was left with a weakened military, and Nehru focused more on building India’s democratic institutions rather than strengthening its defense forces.
Nehru’s administration did not prioritize modernizing the Indian military, and the country’s defense infrastructure was inadequate. The military lacked modern weaponry, equipment, and logistical support for a full-scale conflict, especially with a formidable neighbor like China. Nehru’s focus on social and economic development, although important, meant that the military’s needs were neglected.
Nehru’s Misjudgment of China’s Intentions
Nehru had a fundamental misjudgment about China’s strategic intentions. Initially, India and China had enjoyed cordial relations, with Nehru even being one of the prominent proponents of the “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai” (Indians and Chinese are brothers) slogan. Nehru believed that India and China could coexist peacefully due to their shared anti-colonial history and similar ideological stances at the time. However, China’s rise as a regional power under Mao Zedong was accompanied by increasingly aggressive territorial claims, especially in areas like Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.
Nehru’s belief in China’s peaceful intentions blinded him to the military threat China posed. Despite warnings from military leaders, intelligence reports, and border skirmishes with China, Nehru continued to downplay the possibility of a war. He relied too much on diplomacy, believing that China, having gained international recognition and support from the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC), would not engage in aggressive territorial expansion at India’s expense.
Ignoring Military Advice and Intelligence Warnings
One of the most significant reasons for India’s defeat in 1962 was Nehru’s ignorance of military advice. India’s defense chiefs, including the then Chief of Army Staff, General Kodandera Madappa Cariappa and Lieutenant General B. M. Kaul, repeatedly warned Nehru and his government about the impending threat from China. The Indian military had also reported that China had been building up its forces along the borders. However, Nehru, who had little military experience, did not act on these warnings.
When military officers urged Nehru to strengthen India’s defenses along the Sino-Indian border, he ignored them and maintained his belief that China would not initiate an attack. Nehru was also convinced that China would respect the boundary agreements that had been in place since the British Raj.
Nehru’s Over-Dependence on Diplomacy
Throughout the build-up to the war, Nehru remained hopeful that diplomatic engagement would prevent an armed conflict. He attempted to resolve the border issue with China through talks, while China was preparing for war. Nehru continued to pursue diplomacy even after the border clashes in 1959, which should have served as a warning. Nehru’s ignorance about China’s military preparations and expansionism left India vulnerable to a surprise attack.
China, on the other hand, had already made up its mind to assert its territorial claims, especially in the Aksai Chin region, which it had occupied by 1950 and was building roads to connect Tibet with Xinjiang. India’s appeasement policy failed to recognize China’s growing ambitions, which led to disastrous consequences for India.
Nehru’s belief in India’s political and military superiority over China led to misplaced confidence. The Indian public, the military, and political leaders believed that India’s democratic nature and large population would be sufficient to deter Chinese aggression. The Cultural Revolution in China further led many to underestimate China’s military capability.
Furthermore, Nehru’s domestic political agenda and the associated focus on economic reforms diverted attention from military needs. Nehru’s reluctance to spend on defense during the early 1960s—prioritizing infrastructure, education, and poverty alleviation—made it difficult for India to prepare adequately for the threat China posed.
In October 1962, China launched a full-scale offensive on India’s northeastern border (Arunachal Pradesh) and the Aksai Chin region. Despite being caught off guard, the Indian army initially fought bravely, but the lack of equipment, logistics, and poor strategic planning led to an embarrassing defeat. The war ended with a ceasefire brokered by the United Nations, and India was forced to cede significant territory to China.
Nehru’s role in the defeat was critical. His failure to prepare India militarily, his over-reliance on diplomacy, and his ignorance of intelligence warnings directly contributed to the collapse of India’s defenses. The war also exposed the lack of a coherent strategy to safeguard India’s borders.
1965: Withdrawal From Lahore
In 1965, Indian troops had advanced deep into Lahore, Pakistan, during the conflict. However, after a ceasefire was called, India ordered its forces to pull back. Indira Gandhi, although not the Prime Minister at the time, was a senior cabinet member who endorsed this decision. The military gains were surrendered without any strategic leverage, and a golden opportunity to resolve the Kashmir issue permanently was missed.
1971: The Shimla Agreement
Following India’s victory in the 1971 war and the creation of Bangladesh, Pakistan had surrendered, with 90,000 prisoners of war in Indian custody. Yet, India released these prisoners without securing any resolution on Kashmir, thus squandering a strategic advantage. Indira Gandhi, despite having won the war, made the decision to release the prisoners and engage in the Shimla Agreement, leaving the Kashmir issue unresolved.
Each of these episodes highlights moments in history where significant concessions were made under Congress leadership—whether it was Nehru’s decisions in Kashmir, his refusal of the UNSC seat, or Indira Gandhi’s surrender during the Shimla Agreement. The narrative of “surrender” that Rahul Gandhi’s family conveniently ignores has shaped much of India’s modern history. It was not Narendra Modi or the BJP, but Nehru, Indira Gandhi, and Congress that were behind these decisions.
(This article is based on an X Thread By Anand)
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