Italy, 2002. Soile Lautsi, a Finnish-origin Italian citizen and member of the Italian Union of Atheists, found out that a crucifix was hung on the walls of every classroom in the school attended by her two children. Being a firm believer in the principles of secularism and wanting to pass on that belief to her children, she filed a complaint to the school board asking that the crucifixes be removed; after all, the crucifixes’ presence in the school contravened the principles of secularism.
Italy’s laws from the early twentieth century make classroom crucifixes mandatory, even though the laws have not been aggressively enforced ever since Catholicism stopped being the state religion. Anyway, in May of 2002, the school board decided not to remove the crucifixes and the Ministry of Education confirmed this. Mrs. Lautsi claimed that the school board’s decision conflicted with the principles of secularism and state neutrality enshrined in the constitution of Italy and filed a complaint in the Veneto Regional Administrative Court. In January of 2004, the Administrative Court permitted the case to be submitted before the Constitutional Court, as per Mrs Lautsi’s request. The Constitutional Court disavowed jurisdiction and returned the case to the Administrative Court.
The Administrative Court then ruled against Mrs. Lautsi. This ruling held that the presence of the crucifixes in the classroom did not violate the principle of secularism and nor did it infringe upon the religious freedom that was guaranteed under the Italian Constitution!
In its judgement, the regional court held that the crucifix was certainly a Christian religious symbol, but it was also a symbol of the shared history and culture of Italy; it was thus representative of the identity of the Italian people. The Court pronounced that the secular state, freedom, and equal rights – all of which were key elements of the Enlightenment – derive from the doctrines of Christianity. The Court “perceive[d] an affinity between (but not the identity of) the ‘hard core’ of Christianity, which, placing charity above everything else, including faith, emphasises the acceptance of difference, and the ‘hard core’ of the republican Constitution, which, in a spirit of solidarity, attaches value to the freedom of all, and therefore constitutes the legal guarantee of respect for others.”1 Therefore, the Court saw the crucifix “as a symbol of a value system: liberty, equality, human dignity, and religious toleration, and accordingly also of the secular nature of the State – principles which underpin our Constitution.”2
The Secular Crucifix
In other words, the crucifix was a symbol of the principles of equality, liberty, and tolerance, and thus – the Court ruled – it was also a symbol of state secularism! (Imagine that, a religious symbol as a symbol of secularism!) The Court also accepted the argument of the Italian government that not only was the crucifix a religious symbol, but also a symbol of the Italian state! To the layperson reading this, this might sound absolutely absurd, especially if you hail from a country where saffron is supposedly a fascist colour and placing saffron flags on a fruit-stall can get you arrested for ‘rioting, ‘unlawful assembly’, ‘disobedience’ and ‘hurting religious sentiments’. (There have also been several demands in the past by secularists to prohibit Sanskrit shlokas from being chanted in the morning assemblies of government-run schools and to also have Sanskrit shlokas removed from school curriculum. Many secularists seem to believe that anything said in Sanskrit can never be secular.)
Here, it is to be noted that while the court held that the crucifix could have several meanings, including an interpretation that is strictly religious, these meanings were “ultimately irrelevant”3 to the case at hand. According to the court, the presence of students from different cultures in Italian public schools had made it vital to reiterate Italian identity, and that Christianity was the only religion which does not reject unbelievers, since charity is held above all other values in Christianity. Even as a Christian symbol, the crucifix is “the universal sign of the acceptance of and respect for every human being as such, irrespective of any belief, religious or other, which he or she may hold”4, the Court stated.
Mrs. Lautsi appealed to the Council of State, the supreme administrative court in Italy, against this decision. In February 2006, the Council of State dismissed Mrs. Lautsi’s appeal on the basis that the cross is indeed a symbol of the secular values of the Italian constitution. The crucifix symbolised the religious origins of the tenets of mutual respect, tolerance, and freedom of conscience. (Readers ought to note that these values are secular values). In the Italian Constitution, secularism is not stated explicitly, but derived from certain other Constitutional articles. Secularism, the court stated, had to emerge from within this legal structure under certain conditions, conditions such as Italy’s “cultural traditions and customs”.5
The court also ruled that the meaning of the crucifix varied according to the place or context where it is displayed. It was possible that the crucifix could also be deprived of its symbolic significance and displayed as a mere ornament of some artistic value. In a non-religious backdrop of a school, the crucifix does not discriminate if it can represent “values which are important for civil society”.6 Furthermore, the crucifix acts as a reference-point and clearly shows the transcendent source (this source being obviously Christian and religious) of the secular values enshrined in the Italian constitution without opposing and diminishing the secular nature of the Constitution.
European reversal and re-reversal
Mrs. Lautsi then complained to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and finally, on 3 November 2009, the court ruled unanimously that the display of crucifixes in Italy’s public schools is opposed to the children’s religious freedom and to the parents’ right to educate their children in agreement with their beliefs. The ECtHR rejected the rationale of the Italian judges and concluded that displaying crucifixes in state schools amounts to a breach of state neutrality. The religious connotation of the crucifix is prominent and is linked with the majority religion in Italy, it said. Display of religious symbols in classrooms went against the secular convictions and could disturb students of non-Christian religions and those students who professed no religion. The State ought to refrain from imposing, directly or indirectly, any beliefs upon people in situations where they are dependent on the State. A Secular State “had a duty to uphold confessional neutrality in public education”7, the court pronounced. The compulsory display of crucifixes was “incompatible with the State’s duty to respect neutrality in the exercise of public authority, particularly in the field of education”.8
The European court’s judgement resulted in public uproar not only in Italy but across Europe. The Italian government was joined by other third parties, including twenty other European nations, all of whom strongly opposed this interpretation of the ECtHR. They argued that the crucifix was a “passive symbol” whose presence expressed a “national particularity” characterised by the interactions between the Italian State, the people and Catholicism; these interactions were further ascribed to Italy’s historical, cultural and territorial development.9 All in all, the crucifix was a cultural symbol representing the foundational principles of Western Civilization and democracy. Their presence in the classrooms was to “enable children to understand the national community in which they were expected to integrate”.10 But the applicants further argued that the positioning of the crucifix, which was undeniably a religious symbol, as a cultural symbol was “an attempt to maintain a hopeless last-ditch defence”.11
The ECtHR finally reversed its earlier judgement in March 2011. The Court ruled that its task at hand was to examine whether the presence of school crucifixes clashed with articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, and not to assess the compatibility between secularism as protected or guaranteed under the Italian Constitution and the presence of school crucifixes. The judges also brought in the margin of appreciation, as submitted by several intervening organisations and European countries, and left it to each member-state of the European Union to decide if crucifixes were allowed in state schools. The judges of the ECtHR also said that the crucifix while undoubtedly a Christian religious symbol – whether or not an additional secular meaning was attached to it – it was also “essentially passive” and its presence does not actively indoctrinate or impose any religious beliefs.12
Lessons on secularism
Are there any lessons that could be learnt from this case, especially for Indians?
To start with, we see here secularism taken to its logical end by the Secular State: the Secular State seeks to establish a neutral public space that is untainted by any religious symbols and religious symbolism. However, what is the scope of religion, and what comes under the range or reach of religion, and what distinguishes the religious from the secular – the answers to these questions remain unclear. The Secular State cannot even determine what is a religious symbol and what is a secular or cultural symbol! Paradoxically, the secular courts engage in theology and hold discussions on religion to determine what counts as a religious symbol and what does not – all of which is done in order to fashion a space that is devoid of religion. Things are no different, and no less ridiculously absurd, in the Republic of India. But that is a matter of discussion for another time.
Secondly, it is noteworthy that while the Italian courts and the Italian State saw the cross as a cultural symbol and also as a symbol of the secular state (consider, for instance, the high improbability of an Indian court ever viewing a saffron flag or the Sanskrit language as a symbol of the secular Indian state), the European Court of Human Rights argued in its first judgement that while the symbol of the crucifix has several meanings, the religious connotation is predominant and hence students would interpret the crucifix as a religious symbol. The public display of a religious sign in an educational setting, the ECtHR had said, would imply to the students that the Italian State was endorsing that particular religion, which in this case was Catholicism. This would be disturbing to atheists and to members of other religious communities, the ECtHR added. The freedom of religion ensured under the European Charter of Human Rights includes the freedom not to believe, and the Court said that this freedom has to be protected especially when it was the State that was expressing a religious belief by a public display of the crucifix in a school. The Court also remarked that public display of a crucifix could not possibly work for the cause of pluralism. The Court’s ruling observed that the display of religious symbols in state-run institutions impeded the parents’ rights to educate their children in conformity to their beliefs, and also restricted the children’s rights to believe or not to believe.13
Here, it might be relevant for us to ask that if an overtly Christian symbol like the crucifix can be a symbol of secularism, can there be other symbols from other religions that may be interpreted as being a secular symbol? Or, can these symbols be interpreted as a symbol, not of secularism itself, but of a Secular State?
The answer to this question lies in another remarkable observation of the Italian courts (which is also the third lesson that can be drawn from this case) – that the secular nature of the Italian Constitution originated in the teachings and doctrines of Christianity. The Italian judges reasoned (and rightly so) that secularism was (and still is) a development within Christianity. It was (and again, still is) a part of the worldview shaped by the centuries-long historical events that occurred in European Christendom. In such a case, Italian (and European) secularism is inherently Christian in nature. In other words, it is a Christian secularism and can be justifiably represented by the crucifix. The Council of State went so far as to give interpretations of Christian teachings (note that the secular body engages in theological matters) and argued that these teachings correspond with secular values. How then, could a non-Christian religious symbol be a symbol of secularism?
Here is another related question: if there is a Christian secularism, can there be a Muslim secularism or a Hindu secularism? Evidently not, since secularism emerged in the European Christian context. That is to say, the liberal secular model that is followed in different parts of the world stems from secularism as it developed in this Christian framework in European societies.
To what extent then is secularism acceptable as a model for coexistence between different communities in non-Christian, non-European societies? What effect will secularism have on the indigenous non-Christian religions and traditions of that society? How do people not familiar with Christian doctrines and secularism’s foundation in Christian theology interpret secularism? What are the implications of implementing secularism in a society where Christian theology has never before been used to address political inquiries and administrative goals? – these then become valid questions that need to be asked and explored.
The question of the saffron flag
Let us now come back to the much-maligned saffron flag. Is it a religious symbol or a cultural symbol?
Let us presume that the saffron flag is on top of a residential building. Is it a cultural symbol? Maybe. It could also be a religious symbol, depending on the religious inclinations of the people living in the building. There is perhaps no way to determine exactly whether it is a cultural symbol or a religious symbol, since there is a large overlap between Hindu religious traditions and Indian cultures. What if the same flag is hung inside the puja room of a family living in the building? Now, arguably, the flag takes on a religious connotation.
Let us add another dimension to the question. What if a saffron flag is on top of a building that houses the offices of a political party? Is the flag now a cultural symbol or a religious symbol or a political symbol?
Can a saffron flag be a social symbol, in the sense that it is representative of a society or a community and thus evokes a collective identity, as was the case of the secular crucifix in Italy? (Of course, several people would be quick to argue that such symbolism imposes “majoritarian” beliefs on minority communities, but nobody ever bothers to explain how a mere flag fluttering in the wind can “impose” beliefs upon people. Let us say some Italian unacquainted with Indian politics and social discourse views a saffron flag. Would the individual interpret the flag as a cultural or religious sign? Would the flag impose “majoritarian” beliefs on such a person? How does such “imposition” happen?)
What about a saffron flag on top of a temple or a religious structure? Is that a religious symbol or a cultural symbol? Could it be both? This is a more difficult question to answer. Another question that is more difficult to answer is this: do such distinctions between the religious and the cultural, between the religious and the secular, make sense in a Hindu context?
Furthermore, does a symbol like a saffron flag or a swastika have a meaning that is somehow embedded in it and is recognizable all over the world, or is the meaning dependent on the framework or a background setting where the symbol is situated?
Do symbols on public display have multiple meanings or do they take on one predominant interpretation? (Before answering this question, it would be pertinent to ask by what mechanism symbols take on meaning in the first place.)
Or is the meaning in the eye of the beholder, with symbols meaning different things for different people? In such a scenario where the meaning of a symbol is supposedly ambiguous, are the State and its legal machinery the ones who get to establish – even impose – meaning on to a symbol and thus decide the (non-)issue for the masses?
This array of questions might seem silly (and they are) to the reader. Some might think that all this amounts to futile hair-splitting. But if the Secular State wishes to create a secular religion-neutral space, these questions must be deliberated upon sooner or later. Readers must observe that only in a Secular State are such questions necessary.
Footnotes
- Lautsi v. Italy, paragraph 15
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Lautsi v. Italy, paragraph 16
- Ibid.
- Lautsi v. Italy, paragraph 31
- Lautsi v. Italy, paragraph 32
- Lautsi v. Italy, paragraph 36
- Lautsi v. Italy, paragraph 39
- Lautsi v. Italy, paragraph 42
- Lautsi v. Italy, paragraph 71-72
- Lautsi v. Italy, paragraph 31-32
Further Reading
- European Court of Human Rights, Case of Lautsi and Others v. Italy, Application no. 30814/06, Judgement dated 18 March 2011
- Andreescu, Gabriel, and Liviu Andreescu. “The European Court of Human Rights Lautsi Decision: Context, Contents, Consequences.” Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies9, no. 26 (2010): 47-74.
- De Roover, Jakob. Europe, India, and the limits of secularism. No. s 11. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015.